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ABSTRACT 
METACOGNITIVE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY: A PATH ANALYSIS 
Ryan Patrick Hosey 
July 13,2012 
Social anxiety is prevalent and debilitating. Contemporary models of social 
anxiety posit that negative, self-focused thought aids in the maintenance of social anxiety 
symptoms. Although these models emphasize in-situation cognition, recent findings have 
linked two perseverative thought constructs, anticipatory processing (pre-event) and post-
event processing (post-event), to social anxiety symptoms. The current study was 
designed to investigate whether these maladaptive thinking styles are perpetuated by the 
superordinate process of metacognition. In particular, three domains of metacognition 
were included in the current study: metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive monitoring, and 
metacognitive (attentional) control. A hypothesized model wherein these three 
metacognitive processes maintain social anxiety symptoms via anticipatory and post-
event processing was tested using path analysis. Previously established direct and 
hypothesized indirect relationships within this model were evaluated. One hundred fifty 
four undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university participated in the study 
and provided self-report data regarding the mentioned constructs. Results indicate that, 
overall, this model was a good fit for the data. Contrary to expectations, a number of the 
v 
previously established direct relationships failed to reach statistical significance 
within the context of the path model. In terms of indirect relationships, only one pathway 
was significant. The indirect pathway between metacognitive beliefs and social anxiety 
symptoms via anticipatory processing was significant. Overall these findings suggest that 
cognitive phenomena associated with social anxiety interact dynamically. Moreover, 
these findings corroborate Wells' model of psychological distress as it suggests that 
metacognitive beliefs (positive and negative) held about anticipatory processing sustains 
it and, in turn, perpetuates symptoms of social anxiety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) has debilitating effects and is among the most 
common of all mental disorders with lifetime prevalence rates ranging from 3% to 13% 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). Kessler and colleagues (2005) estimate the 1-
year prevalence rate of social anxiety disorder to be 6.8%. Further, it is likely that, in 
addition to the number of people diagnosed with social anxiety disorder, even more suffer 
from a level of social anxiety that is high, but fails to reach diagnostic threshold. At least 
one study indicates that sub-clinical social anxiety was associated with significant 
functional impairment and garnered a higher 12-month prevalence rate than clinical 
levels of social anxiety (Fehm, Hoyer, Schneider, Lindemann, & Klusmann, 2008). 
Given the prevalence and debilitating effects of social anxiety delineating the processes 
that may aid in its development and maintenance warrants further exploration. 
Contemporary models are predominantly cognitive and emphasize the role of self-
focused thoughts and attention as a fundamental component of social anxiety disorder 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Individuals with high levels of social 
anxiety have been found to evidence a corresponding pattern of self-focused cognition 
(e.g. Hartman, 1984; Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004; Spurr & Stopa, 2003). Research in 
this area has largely focused on cognition that occurs during the social experience itself; 
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however, recent findings suggest that social anxiety is also associated with self-focused 
thought processes that occur both before and after the social event. The anticipation of a 
social experience appears to stimulate a worry-like process termed anticipatory 
processing (AP) in the socially anxious individual (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 2004). Following 
the social event, socially anxious individuals engage in post-event processing (PEP), a 
post-hoc review of the experience that focuses on negative appraisals of performance 
(Rachman, Grater-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000). 
Although the predominant cognitive models of social anxiety disorder feature a 
description of cognitive content in the socially anxious individual, the models do not 
detail the cognitive processes that are potentially associated with this self-focused 
thought. In particular, the inclusion of process level phenomena such as perseverative 
thought in conceptual models of social anxiety will help to promote additional 
comprehensiveness to our understanding of the pathology. Factors that maintain these 
cognitive processes may shed yet more light on thinking in the socially anxious 
individual. In this vein, the presence of perseverative cognitive processes in social 
anxiety may be explained by metacognition, a process described by Flavell (1979) as the 
way we perceive and act on our own cognitive processes. More specifically, 
metacognition involves the knowledge of and beliefs about one's own cognitive 
processes, the ability to monitor them, and the capacity to operate on them (Efklides, 
2008). The construct of metacognition may playa role in the development and/or 
maintenance psychopathology. For example, studies have linked metacognition to the 
perseverative thought in GAD and depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Wells, 
2005). Concordantly, an examination of this superordinate function in social anxiety may 
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compliment and build upon existing research that posits cognition as a primary 
component of social anxiety. 
In order to advance our conceptual understanding of social anxiety, the current 
study proposed and tested a model of social anxiety, and provided an initial test of the 
paths of this proposed model. The proposed path model aims to 1) reaffirm the link 
between perseverative thought and social anxiety, and 2) link three metacognitive 
processes (beliefs, monitoring/awareness, control) to social anxiety via perseverative 
thought. To provide empirical context for the proposed model, several areas of research 
were integrated. First, two preeminent cognitive models of social anxiety are reviewed to 
introduce cognition as a fundamental component of pathological social anxiety. Because 
limited research exists regarding perseverative thought in social anxiety, the 
perseverative thought processes of worry in GAD and rumination in depression are 
discussed as analogues of anticipatory and post-event processing so as to provide a 
theoretical framework for the model. Next, self-focused perseverative thought, both pre 
and post-event, in social anxiety is discussed as informed by the two mentioned 
theoretical models and as compared to worry and rumination in GAD and depression. 
The construct of metacognition was explored as a maintenance factor for maladaptive 
perseverative thought common to anxiety and depression. Preliminary findings linking 
metacognitive processes to perseverative thought in social anxiety are reviewed. This 
literature provides the foundation for a test of the proposed model which considers the 
self-focused thought in social anxiety to be perseverative and offers metacognition as a 
possible maintenance factor for this perseverative thought. 
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1. Cognitive Models of Social Anxiety 
Currently, there exist two preeminent theoretical models of social anxiety that 
emphasize cognition, the first proposed by Clark and Wells (1995) and the second by 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997). These models have garnered substantial support and 
largely focus on distorted thought content, cognitive interpretations of physiological 
arousal, and attention allocation. Although they do not discuss what factors may account 
for the presence of these cognitive processes specifically, these two cognitive models 
provide a scientific basis for exploring potential maintenance process for the maladaptive 
thought associated with social anxiety. Further, though these models deal with social 
anxiety disorder specifically, subsequent research has extended these findings to 
subclinical populations. 
1.1 Clark and Wells' cognitive model of social anxiety (1995) 
Clark and Wells (1995) posited that socially anxious individuals believe that, in 
social situations, they are likely to behave in an inept and embarrassing manner, and that 
this "ineptitude" will have significant consequences in terms of social status, self-worth, 
and the viability of their social relationships generally. According to the authors, this 
perception initiates an "anxiety program" in which socially anxious individuals focus 
their attention, disproportionately, on interoceptive information when immersed in a 
social situation. That is, when the prospect of evaluation is present, persons with social 
anxiety disorder tend to shift their focus inward, engaging in detailed monitoring and 
observation of existing negative self-schemas, negative cognitions, and physiological 
anxiety cues (Spurr & Stopa, 2002). Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that the socially 
anxious individual becomes preoccupied with internal experiences (i.e., somatic 
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responses, social-evaluative thoughts) and this preoccupation disrupts the capacity to 
process social cues with any degree of objectivity. Individuals with social anxiety, it is 
posited, rely upon their own negative self-perceptions and physiological experiences as 
the primary source of information about their competence in social situations. 
Interoceptive information gleaned from this self-focused attention is used to develop a 
mental representation of themselves that they assume to be consistent with how they are 
actually viewed by others (Hofmann, 2007). This largely negative self-focused attention 
serves to enhance the aversiveness of the social experience and insinuates that social 
situations are dangerous thus maintaining the experience of social anxiety (Clark, 2001; 
Wells, Clark, Salkovskis, & Ludgate, 1995). 
Research has generally supported the tenets of the model. Using a social 
conversational paradigm, Stopa and Clark (1993) found that individuals with social 
anxiety disorder reported more negative self-evaluative thoughts (e.g., "I'm stupid") than 
individuals with other anxiety disorders or non-anxious controls, but did not report more 
negative evaluative thoughts that referenced the conversational partner (e.g., "he thinks 
I'm stupid"). These results suggest that the socially anxious individual relies on internal, 
self-referencing information to determine social performance rather than external 
information derived from the social environment. Results of another study show that 
persons with SAD experienced intrusive, recurrent, and negative self-images that they 
believed were accurate when their attention was self-focused (Hackmann, Clark, & 
McManus, 2000). In an interesting experimental study, Wells and Papageorgiou (l998b) 
showed that individuals with SAD report less anxiety and fewer negative beliefs about 
themselves following a feared social situation when instructed to focus their attention 
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toward the external environment compared to when they were instructed to "merely" 
staying in the feared situation. These results suggest that the negative self-focus 
associated with SAD contributes to the anxiety experience. In addition, Hirsch and 
Mathews (2000) found that, when presented with a potentially social anxiety provoking 
situation, persons with SAD do not show the positive inferential bias that has been shown 
in non-anxious individuals. The researchers interpreted this finding as evidence of the 
socially anxious individual's tendency to refer to interoceptive information and existing 
negative self-evaluative beliefs, rather than external cues, when making inferences about 
social competence. 
Similar findings have also been reported in subclinical populations. In a study by 
Pozo and colleagues (1991), self-focused attention in persons with high social anxiety 
was found to interfere with their ability to interpret social feedback. That is, individuals 
with high social anxiety construed others' reactions to them more negatively than did less 
socially anxious individuals. Further evidence of self-focused attention was provided by 
Daly, Vangelisti, and Lawrence (1989) who conducted a study in which they showed that 
high speech-anxiety individuals were less attentive to their social environments and 
experienced more negative, self-focused cognitions than did low speech-anxious 
individuals during a speech task. The implications of these studies is further supported 
by research conducted by Hope, Heimberg, and Klein (1990). In this undergraduate 
study, researchers asked participants (females of high and low social anxiety) to engage 
in a social-evaluative interaction, after which they were asked to recall the details of the 
event. The researchers found that high self-focused attention was associated with poor 
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recall for the event in socially anxious individuals. These results were subsequently 
corroborated in a similar study by Hope and colleagues (1998). 
1.2 Rapee and Heimberg's cognitive-behavioral model of social anxiety (1997) 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) proposed a model of social anxiety disorder that is 
generally consistent with the model offered by Clark and Wells (1995). In this model, 
socially anxious individuals possess a negative representation of the self as they believe 
others view them and use this as a referent when entering a social situation. Attention is 
preferentially allocated to internal negative mental representations of the external self, 
interoceptive information, and perceived threats in the environment. Predictions are 
made about social performance, audience expectations, and whether these expectations 
can be met (Roth & Heimberg, 2001). Social anxiety is also related to an overestimation 
of the likelihood and consequences of negative social evaluation. Finally, the level of 
anxiety experienced in the social situation varies as a function of the "predicted 
probability and consequences of negative evaluation" which fluctuates in accordance 
with fluctuations in the previously mentioned stages of the model (Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997, p. 749). This model assumes, generally, that the socially anxious person engages 
in thought focused primarily on the salient (negative) aspects of the self-image when 
confronted with an anxiety stimulating social experience as well as perceived threat in the 
environment. 
The two models are similar insofar as the socially anxious individual is 
hypothesized to derive her notion of social competence via internal cues such as 
physiological arousal and negative mental representations of the self. As mentioned 
previously, there is empirical support for these hypotheses (Daly, et aI., 1989; Hackmann, 
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et aI., 2000; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000; Hope, Heimberg, et aI., 1990; Hope, et aI., 1998; 
Pozo, et aI., 1991; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998b). However, the main point of 
distinction is that the Rapee and Heimberg model also emphasizes the socially anxious 
individual's hypervigilance for threat cues in the environment. That is, the socially 
anxious individual tends to perceive negative social feedback from others despite the 
presence of more positive social feedback. For example, the socially anxious individual, 
according to the model, is likely to notice one angry (or neutral) face in a group while 
ignoring positive responses, such as smiles. This selectively gathered information 
confirms the fears of the socially anxious individual and corroborates the negative mental 
representations of the self (Schultz & Heimberg, 2008). 
The tendency of socially anxious individuals to selectively attend to perceived 
threat in the environment has garnered substantial empirical support in the literature. 
Research using the Stroop task has shown that individuals with SAD selectively attend to 
perceived social threat in the environment (e.g., Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 
1990; Lundh & Ost, 1996; Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, & Bohn, 1996). The gist of these 
findings is that individuals with SAD show a longer latency to name the color of a 
presented social-threat word than when they are presented with a neutral or threatening 
word that is not socially based. Numerous studies have utilized a dot-probe paradigm 
wherein various facial expressions replace social-threat words as the target stimulus. 
These studies have garnered mixed results. That is, some studies have shown that 
individuals with SAD as well as non clinical high social anxiety individuals respond more 
slowly to dots presented following negative faces (Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004), 
while some results suggest slower responding to dots following any faces in socially 
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anxious individuals (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002). Other findings suggest 
faster responding to dots following the presentation of faces of any kind (Sposari & 
Rapee, 2007). Although these findings seem difficult to reconcile, hypervigilance for 
threat (as indicated by faster responding) and avoidance of threat (as indicated by slower 
responding) can, and likely do co-occur. That is, hypervigilance for threat is a 
precondition for avoidance of that same threat and, as such, it is not surprising that 
findings have been mixed in this area. 
1.3 Conclusions and Limitations 
Though there is some theoretical divergence between them, the two models 
discussed in this review are in agreement that cognitive processes, such as attention and 
distorted mental representations of the self, are primary sources of dysfunction in social 
anxiety. It is unclear, however, what mechanisms provide for the perpetuation of 
cognitive dysfunction. Both of the models reviewed here rightly acknowledge the 
importance of cognitive processes, however, the authors concentrate primarily on thought 
content. These models include discussion of the self-focused nature of thought content in 
social anxiety that does, in some ways, provide a higher order or process level description 
of cognition in social anxiety. The primary focus of these models, however, remains 
content oriented. For example, thoughts like "I'm going to embarrass myself' are posited 
as common to social anxiety and distress producing. However, the influence of the 
overall thinking style or process, within which these thoughts occur, remains uncertain. 
That is, the specific thought itself (e.g., "I'm going to embarrass myself') occurs as a 
transient experience, at some point, for most people. It is the way in which the socially 
anxious individual responds to this dysfunctional thought that may be of consequence. A 
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possible distinction between the individual with social anxiety and the individual without 
social anxiety is the coping strategy employed in response to the negative thought. 
Whereas the non-anxious individual experiences passing discomfort relative to the 
negative thought, the socially anxious person appears to inflexibly respond to it with 
prolonged cognitive activity. 
Cognitive activity in psychological disorder has been studied in this vein. In 
particular, worry and rumination in GAD and depression, respectively, have been 
conceptualized as perseverative thinking styles. Given the relative wealth of work in 
these areas, research regarding worry and rumination provides a theoretical backdrop for 
a discussion of perseverative thought in social anxiety. Further, a review of work in these 
areas includes an examination of the underlying mechanisms that are charged with 
regulating and maintaining perseverative thought. Because social anxiety literature is 
quite limited in this area, an examination of worry in GAD and rumination in depression 
provide the best available empirical basis for an examination of possible maintenance 
factors for maladaptive thought in social anxiety. 
2. Perseverative thought in psychopathology 
As evidenced by the two mentioned theoretical models, social anxiety is 
characterized, in large part, by maladaptive thought. Maladaptive thought has also been 
shown to be a primary component of other forms of psychopathology. Cognition in GAD 
and depression has begun to garner attention, not only in terms of maladaptive content, 
but also in terms of a maladaptive, perseverative style or process. Perseverative 
cognition is largely self-focused and has been described as the repeated activation of 
cognitive representations of psychological stressors that results in the prolonging of 
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psychological distress (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 
2005). The following is a review of two perseverative thought processes associated with 
psychopathology, worry and rumination. As will be discussed in a later section, the 
cognitive processes of AP and PEP in social anxiety are qualitatively similar to worry and 
rumination insofar as AP is future oriented worry about a social situation, while PEP is a 
post hoc ruminative review of a past social event. Given these similarities, and the 
availability of research in these areas, worry and rumination provide the best available 
empirical context for a study of the processes that may aid in the maintenance of 
maladaptive thought in social anxiety. 
2.1 Worry 
According to DSM-IV -TR excessive worry, or apprehensive expectation, is a 
cardinal feature of generalized anxiety disorder (DSM-IV -TR; APA, 2000). Although 
worry is a process common to the human experience, pathological worry as is found in 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is qualitatively distinct in terms of increased 
frequency, intensity, and perceived uncontrollability (Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 
1989). The process of worry involves repetitive thought, and associated negative affect, 
about possible future threats (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007). Research 
suggests that this worry is an anticipatory and uncontrollable chain of thoughts laden with 
negative affect that deal with an uncertain outcome and may be a cognitive strategy used 
to avoid the full experience of fear (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & 
DePree, 1983). 
Borkovec's (1994) avoidance theory of worry in GAD stipulates that individuals 
with GAD engage in worry to avoid threat by preparing for future "threats" or preventing 
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them entirely. This belief promotes a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the worry 
behavior is reinforced because the feared event is unlikely to occur in the first place 
(Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). This perpetuates the worry behavior ad infinitum because 
it has ostensibly prevented the threat and thus the negative affect associated with the 
feared threat. Borkovec' s conceptualization of worry as an avoidance coping strategy has 
received empirical support. An experimental study conducted by Borkovec and Hu 
(1990) showed that worry was associated with autonomic inflexibility. In this study, 
participants were instructed to imagine a phobic speech scene 1 of 3 conditions: neutral 
thinking, relaxed thinking, or worried thinking. The participants were asked to engage in 
the designated form of thinking prior to the imagined scene. The researchers measured 
participants' cardiovascular response as an approximation of the negative affect or 
anxiety associated with the phobic scene. Results indicated that individuals in the 
worried thinking condition evidenced a reduced cardiovascular response to the phobic 
imagery. The researchers interpreted this result as evidence of worry functioning as 
avoidance of negative affect. Additional research found similar phenomena for 
individuals with GAD. Thayer, Friedman, and Borkovec (1996) showed that individuals 
with GAD exhibited lower cardiac activity across baseline, relaxation, and worry tasks 
than did nonanxious controls. Further, lower cardiac activity was detected for individuals 
with GAD in the worry task versus the other two conditions. These findings suggest the 
presence of less physiological reactivity, thought to approximate a negative affective or 
anxious response, in individuals with GAD who tend to engage in chronic worry. 
It has also been suggested that worry may be a flawed problem solving strategy 
that is continuous and unsuccessful (Davey, 1994). In this sense, worry involves threat 
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anticipation and the generation of either coping or avoidant problem-solving strategies 
geared towards managing negative affect. It is not that chronic worriers are poor problem 
solvers per se. Research has shown that worry is associated with a perceived lack of 
control of problems solving and less confidence in problem solving abilities, but not poor 
problem solving effectiveness (Davey, 1994). This lower confidence for problem solving 
has also been linked to catastrophizing in individuals with high worry (Davey, Tallis, & 
Capuzzo, 1996). In this study, individuals with high worry were found to exhibit more 
catastrophizing steps in problem solving than were their less anxious counterparts. 
Results of these studies were interpreted to suggest that the process of worry involves 
monitoring for threat-related information but is problematic because the threat is often 
uncontrollable (Davey, 1994). Because the problem is uncontrollable, the process 
continues indefinitely and can thus be considered perseverative. Although there is some 
theoretical disagreement about the function of worry, common across each 
conceptualization is the notion that worry is perseverative and is associated with negative 
affect. That is, worry is theorized to serve as a strategy for managing negative affect. 
Whereas Borkovec argued that worry serves as an avoidance strategy for dealing with 
negative affect, Davey views worry as a failed problem solving strategy geared toward 
managing negative affect. In each case, worry is a coping strategy used to deal with the 
negative affect associated with perceived future threats. 
2.2 Rumination 
Perseverative rumination is closely associated with several forms of 
psychopathology, most notably, depression (e.g. Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; 
Hankin et aI., 2009; Pearson, Brewin, Rhodes, & McCarron, 2008). Similar to worry in 
13 
GAD, cognitive rumination is closely associated with depression and is considered 
perseverative in nature (Donaldson, et aI., 2007; Hankin, et aI., 2009). According to 
Response Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), rumination is a modality of 
responding to distress that involves repetitively and passively focusing on the notion of 
being distressed, symptoms of distress, and on the possible causes and consequences of 
these symptoms. Rumination is further conceptualized as "the process of thinking 
perseveratively about one's feelings and problems rather than in terms of the specific 
content of the thoughts" (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008, p. 1). That is, 
individuals with depression appear to have difficulty disengaging from thoughts about 
their distress and from thinking for a prolonged period of time about the causes and 
implications of their depression. It is a perseverative thinking style characterized by a 
failure to disengage attention from negative self-focused thought content about past 
events (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Research has shown that ruminative thought is 
associated with the maintenance and exacerbation of depressive symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). Results of numerous empirical studies 
indicate that rumination can predict the onset of depressive episodes as well as the 
intensity of the depressive symptoms (e.g. Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 
1998; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998). Other empirical findings indicate that 
rumination is a thinking style that mediates the relationship between risk factors 
associated with depression and depression as an outcome (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). 
In general, ruminative thought is focused on the symptoms and consequences of 
depression exclusively and is not solution-focused (Craighead, Ritschel, Arnarson, & 
Gillespie, 2008). In a larger study of coping strategies, Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub 
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(1989) found supporting the notion that rumination is not solution focused. Results of 
this study suggested that people who engage in rumination are less likely than non-
ruminators to actively solve problems. That is, for depressed individuals, rumination is, 
in some ways, a passive coping or problem solving strategy. Further, Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1991) showed that rumination tends to exhaust cognitive resources, thus interfering with 
active problem solving and decision making abilities. 
2.3 Conclusions and limitations 
In general, research indicates that perseverative thinking styles are associated with 
the maintenance of negative affective states such as depression and anxiety (e.g. 
Borkovec, 1994; Calmes & Roberts, 2007; McLaughlin, et aI., 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, et 
aI., 1993). Two forms of repetitive thought have garnered significant attention in 
research, worry in GAD and rumination in depression. Worry is related to anxious affect 
and possible future threat while rumination involves "repetitive thought about past 
events, current mood states, or failure to achieve goals" (McLaughlin, et aI., 2007, p. 26). 
There is debate in the literature regarding the conceptual margins of these constructs. 
Some research has conceptualized worry and rumination as specific forms of the 
same overarching perseverative thought construct (Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 
2000) while other research suggests that, although the constructs are similar, they retain 
important distinctions (Hong, 2007). In this study, the researchers found that worry and 
rumination are differentially related to coping behaviors and clinical symptoms. Results 
of this study suggest that worry is uniquely linked to anxious and depressive symptoms 
generally, while rumination is uniquely related to depression. These linkages are, in part, 
an artifact of their respective influences on coping phenomena. That is, worry is linked 
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to low perceived coping effectiveness while rumination is related to problem 
disengagement. Muris and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that worry and rumination, 
though significantly correlated, were distinct from one another in factor analysis. Given 
the conceptual similarities between AP and worry as well as the similarities between PEP 
and rumination, it seems important to obtain more clarity as to the boundaries of these 
constructs. Whether worry and rumination are theoretically distinct perseverative 
thought constructs or whether they are two variants of the same larger perseverative 
thought construct is an important empirical question. Future research should further 
clarify the relationship between worry and rumination and how these constructs are 
concomitantly or differentially related to psychological outcome. 
3. Self-focused perseverative thought in social anxiety 
As illustrated by the two preeminent cognitive models, self-focused thought is 
common to social anxiety and may act to maintain psychological distress (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Although both models are focused predominantly on 
in-situation processing, the model proposed by Rapee and Heimberg (1997) includes 
references to post-event processing, while the model proposed by Clark and Wells (1995) 
includes anticipatory processing and post-event processing as maintenance factors for 
social anxiety. These two constructs will be reviewed in the following section. In 
addition, previous research regarding worry in GAD and rumination in depression 
suggest a perseverative thinking style associated with psychopathology. Consistent with 
this research, perseverative thought appears to be associated with social anxiety 
(Rachrnan, et aI., 2000; Zou, Hudson, & Rapee, 2007). In light of these findings, the 
constructs of AP and PEP will be conceptualized similarly as perseverative in nature. 
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3.1 Anticipatory processing in social anxiety 
Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that the socially anxious individual 
experiences an anxious response prior to entering the feared social event. Socially 
anxious individuals think about the social situation in advance, anticipate negative 
outcomes, and predict poor performance and ultimately rejection. This anticipatory 
thought process is hypothesized to elevate anxiety, encourage avoidance, and prime the 
person to be negatively self-focused when entering the social situation. Although 
literature in this area remains quite sparse, there is some empirical support for the 
presence of AP in social anxiety. Vassilopolous (2004) developed an empirical measure 
of AP and found via factor analysis of the scale that all items, save two, loaded on one 
overarching factor that the researchers interpreted as anticipatory processing. Utilizing 
this measure, it was shown that individuals high in social anxiety engaged in more AP 
prior to a feared social event than did individuals low in social anxiety. Further, 
Vassipoulos (2008) conducted a study in which he showed that individuals high in social 
anxiety engaged in anticipatory mental processes more frequently than did individuals 
low in social anxiety. 
It appears, then, that there exists a relationship between AP and social anxiety; 
however, the mentioned studies do not indicate what effect AP may have on the socially 
anxious individual. To this end, Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) utilized an induction 
technique the anxiety inducing quality of anticipatory processing in social anxiety. In 
one part of the study, participants high and low in social anxiety to were asked to engage 
in AP or a distraction task prior to a social-evaluative event. Results indicated that AP 
was related to increased anxiety prior to the social-evaluative event and to higher levels 
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of peak anxiety during the event itself. The authors stipulated that, although induction 
effects were detected for both groups (high and low social anxiety), anticipatory anxiety 
is a process characteristic of high socially anxious individuals and thus should be 
afforded consideration as a maintenance factor for pathological social anxiety. Lending 
further support to this finding, Vassipolous (2005) used an induction technique in which 
participants were asked to engage in either AP or a distraction task prior to giving a 
speech. The researchers examined the effects of anticipatory processing by randomly 
assigning individuals high in social anxiety to an AP condition or a distraction condition. 
Results showed that AP was associated with higher anxiety symptoms and negative 
predictions about future performance in a social situation versus the distraction condition. 
3.2 Anticipatory processing as perseverative thought 
A relationship between AP and social anxiety has been supported by empirical 
work (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2004, 2005; Stephanos Ph 
Vassilopoulos, 2008). However, the characteristics of AP in social anxiety have only 
begun to receive empirical attention. Whether AP can be considered a perseverative 
cognitive process has not been discussed specifically. However, there are indications that 
AP in social anxiety is perseverative thought. AP in social anxiety has been described as 
a worry-like process specific to feared social events (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Wells, 
1997). Previous work has underscored the perseverative nature of worry (Borkovec, 
1994; Davey, 1994; McLaughlin, et aI., 2007). Given the conceptual similarities between 
worry and AP and the perseverative nature of worry (e.g. McLaughlin, et aI., 2007), AP 
is posited to be a form of perseverative thought. More specifically, as mentioned 
previously, AP in social anxiety is future-oriented worry about a social event, is 
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associated with increased social anxiety, and encourages avoidance. Although this worry 
process is centered around a social event, the mentioned characteristics are qualitatively 
similar to worry in GAD. While empirical findings in this area are lacking, there is some 
support for the hypothesis that AP is a form of perseverative thinking akin to worry in 
GAD. 
As noted earlier, Vassilopolous (2004) developed an empirical measure of 
anticipatory processing. In addition to establishing a relationship between AP and social 
anxiety, Vassilopolous described the nature of AP for individuals high in social anxiety. 
AP, for these individuals, was characterized by persistent thoughts about the imminent 
social event that were intrusive, frequent, and interfered with concentration. Individuals 
high in social anxiety were unable to resist thinking about the upcoming event, tended to 
make more negative predictions about the outcome or consequences of the event, and 
were more apt to consider avoiding the event. Individuals high in social anxiety used AP 
to predict, in great detail, their own future behavior and how others would perceive and 
respond to their predicted behavior. This persistent and intrusive anticipatory processing, 
according to Vassipolous, was associated with an increase in emotional distress. In 
accordance with this conceptualization, Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) provided description 
of the construct where, in anticipation of a social event, individuals high in social anxiety 
were more likely than low social anxiety individuals to 1) dwell on avoidance and escape 
strategies 2) catastrophize about potential social failure and 3) consider negative, 
distorted images of themselves in the upcoming social event. In another study by 
Vassilopoulos (2008), an undergraduate sample was used to examine AP as a coping 
response in social anxiety. Participants were first presented with two vignettes of future 
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anxiety-provoking situations and then directed to describe their thoughts relative to the 
two vignettes. Results suggested that anticipatory processing for individuals high in 
social anxiety was characterized, in part, by mental preparation for future stressful events. 
In particular, individuals high in social anxiety tended to think about how to conceal their 
anxiety or how to avoid the stressful situation. 
Findings provided by Lorberbaum and colleagues (2004) lend further credence to 
the hypothesis that AP is perseverative. Participants were socially phobic and were asked 
to give a I-minute impromptu speech on an unknown topic in front of an audience. 
Using fMRI technology, the researchers found that socially anxious individuals exhibited 
less activity in cortical regions associated with the ability to shift from one thought 
process to another, suggesting a perseverative thinking style. The authors concluded that 
because of this reduced activity in specific cortical regions, socially anxious individuals 
have trouble disengaging from thought processes. This finding is especially salient given 
that the fMRI analyses detected this phenomenon during times of increased social 
anxiety. This implies that the difficulty shifting from one thought process to another is 
present during heightened social anxiety. As stated previously, perseverative thought is 
prolonged and repetitive. It reasons, then, that difficulty disengaging from a particular 
thought process plays a role in the manifestation of perseverative thought. In another 
study, Vassipolous (2008) presented participants with vignettes regarding the anticipation 
of a feared social event and asked them to report the details of their thoughts about the 
scenarios. Responses were categorized based on a coding scheme for AP and results 
suggested that individuals high in social anxiety were more likely to engage in stagnant 
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deliberation (dwelling repetitively and negatively on a life stressor) during anticipatory 
processing compared to individuals low in social anxiety. 
3.3 Post-event processing in social anxiety 
Similar to AP, post-event processing (PEP) is a self-focused thought process that 
takes place outside of the social experience itself. It is described as a detailed review or 
"post-mortem" of events following a social interaction (Rachman, et aI., 2000) and may 
be specific to social anxiety (Fehm, Schneider, & Hoyer, 2007). For socially anxious 
individuals, it is a type of cognitive rumination involving perceived inadequacies, 
mistakes, and/or imperfections that increases expectations of failure and related anxiety 
in future social situations (Dannahy & Stopa, 2007). In order to show empirically this 
prospective relationship between PEP and social anxiety, Kocovski and Rector (2007) 
utilized self-report measures to investigate the hypothesis that social anxiety, anxious 
rumination, and anxiety sensitivity are correlates of post-event processing. Results 
indicated that both social anxiety and anxious rumination predicted PEP, while anxiety 
sensitivity was not related to PEP. The authors concluded that social anxiety is 
maintained, in part, by cognitive processes such as PEP that perpetuate negative 
perceptions of the self and consequently do not allow for the disconfirmation of beliefs 
regarding the dangerousness of social situations. 
The relationship between social anxiety and PEP has also been shown in 
observational studies. For example, Abbott and Rapee (2004) asked participants to 
complete measures of post-event rumination and perceived performance immediately 
after a socially distressing social task and at I-week follow-up. Results indicated that 
socially anxious individuals engaged in more post-event rumination than did controls and 
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maintained negative self-appraisals at the I-week follow-up while the non-anxious group 
showed increased positivity about their performance. The authors interpret these findings 
as evidence of a cyclical process whereby negative PEP is activated following a 
perceived failure and, in tum, reinforces negative beliefs about the self thus maintaining 
the anxiety over time. In another study, researchers used a social interaction task to 
examine the relationship between self-appraisals of performance and PEP in individuals 
high and low in social anxiety (Dannahy & Stopa, 2007). Participants were told they 
would engage in a conversation with a stranger on two occasions that were one week 
apart from one another. The frequency and valence of PEP during this week was 
assessed showing that individuals high in social anxiety engaged in more frequent and 
more negative PEP than did individuals low in social anxiety. 
In addition, at least one study used an experimental manipulation to examine the 
relationship between post-event processing and negative affect in social anxiety (Kashdan 
& Roberts, 2007). The researchers recruited an undergraduate sample and randomly 
assigned participants to one of two 45-minute social interaction conditions: a personal 
disclosure condition or a small-talk condition. Participants returned 24 hours later to 
complete several self-report instruments including a post-event rumination measure. 
Interestingly, results showed that post-event rumination was associated with increased 
negative affect for socially anxious individuals in the personal disclosure condition but 
was associated with decreased negative affect for socially anxious individuals in the 
small-talk condition. This finding was attributed to the tendency for socially anxious 
individuals to exhibit greater concerns about social evaluation relative to the amount of 
information revealed about the self. 
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3.4 Post-event processing as perseverative thought 
While the presence of PEP in social anxiety is gaining more empirical support, 
more work is needed to delineate the construct. Specifically, it is important to establish 
whether PEP is a perseverative thought process similar to rumination in depression. The 
constructs are similar insofar as both rumination and PEP are past-oriented thought 
processes that focus on perceived negative events, negative mood states, and are 
associated with increased symptoms. To examine the nature of PEP in social anxiety, 
Rachman and colleagues (2000) developed the post-event processing questionnaire 
(PEPQ). In addition to establishing a link between PEP and social anxiety, the 
researchers found that PEP was characterized by a recurrent and intrusive quality that 
causes interference with concentration and is associated with avoidance of social 
situations. Fehm and colleagues (2008) corroborated this finding by asking participants to 
recall a social-anxiety evoking event that had occurred during the past six months. 
Participants were then administered a slightly modified version of the PEPQ. Although 
not the main focus of the study, factor analysis revealed that PEP in social anxiety is 
perseverative insofar as it involves frequent thoughts about the social event that are 
difficult to forget, cause interference with concentration, are undesirable, and persist 
despite resistance. 
Further evidence ofthe perseverative nature of post-event processing was 
provided by Lundh and Sperling (2002) who used a diary method to gather more detailed 
information about the process and content of PEP. Undergraduate students were asked to 
complete a diary account, of PEP at three times: immediately following a socially 
distressing event, that evening before bed, and again the following evening. For 
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individuals high in social anxiety, level of PEP on the day of the socially distressing 
event predicted the level of PEP on the following day suggesting a sustained, or 
perseverative, process. Building on self-report research, Perini, Abbot, and Rapee (2006) 
conducted a study that included a social performance task in which they asked 
participants to give an impromptu speech. One week later, each participant completed a 
measure of PEP, the Post-Event Rumination Questionnaire. Results indicated that 
individuals high in social anxiety engaged in more persistent and repetitive brooding over 
the perceived negative aspects of their performance during the one week interval than did 
their less anxious counterparts. 
3.5 The relationship between AP and PEP in social anxiety 
The boundary between anticipatory and post-event processing is not sufficiently 
demarcated. In this sense, Dannahy and Stopa (2007) found that negative thoughts about 
a past social event (PEP), started to increase as another feared social event was 
approaching. This seems to show some overlap between negative rumination about a 
past event and anticipatory worry about a future event. In his psychometric study of 
anticipatory processing, Vassipolous (2004) acknowledged that AP and PEP involve 
"pretty similar cognitive processes, with the difference that anticipatory processing is 
future oriented whereas post-event processing is past-oriented" (p. 309). Results of a 
recent psychometric study suggest that repetitive (or perseverative) thinking, in general, 
may be a transdiagnostic phenomenon (McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010). In this 
study, the researchers developed a measure that integrated items from three existing 
measures of repetitive thought that were specific to worry in GAD, rumination in 
depression, and post-event processing in social anxiety specifically. Factor analysis 
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yielded two factors of which one, labeled Repetitive Negative Thought, was linked to 
numerous negative emotional states (e.g., anxiety, depression, anger). 
3.6 Conclusions and limitations 
Findings suggest that the socially anxious individual is self-focused, not only 
during the social interaction itself, but also prior to and subsequent to the social event. 
Anticipatory processing is associated with increased anxiety, predictions of social failure, 
and likely primes the individual to be anxious upon entering the social event. Post-event 
processing is another form of self-focused thought that informs negative self-perceptions 
and increases anxiety in the long-run. The degree to which this self-focused cognition is 
perseverative has not been addressed explicitly in the literature. The studies reviewed in 
the previous section provide some general support for the perseverative qualities of both 
anticipatory processing and post-event processing in social anxiety. Both of these 
cognitive processes are persistent, resistant to disengagement (i.e., uncontrollable), and 
are associated with the maintenance and, perhaps, exacerbation of negative affective 
states. These findings, while persuasive, require more empirical attention. Specifically, 
the links between AP and social anxiety and PEP and social anxiety should be replicated. 
There appears to be some boundary confusion between AP and PEP as evidenced 
by the findings in which PEP was found to increase in anticipation of a feared event 
(Dannahy & Stopa, 2007) and was posited to be a process similar to AP (Vassilopoulos, 
2004). Qualitatively, they are quite similar insofar as they are recurrent and intrusive, i.e. 
perseverative. The primary distinction appears to be the temporal focus of AP and PEP. 
Future research should clarify the parameters of these two constructs so as to provide a 
more well-defined boundary, if one exists. The implications of McEvoy's psychometric 
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study (2010) can be applied, theoretically, within diagnoses as well as across them. It is 
possible that the overarching construct of repetitive/perseverative thought in social 
anxiety contains both anticipatory and post-event processing. It is also possible that the 
constructs are independent or part of a larger perseverative thought phenomenon but 
retain their distinctiveness. That is, the relationship between AP and PEP may be similar 
to findings in the GAD and depression literature suggesting that worry and rumination, 
while associated with one another, are differentially related to coping behaviors and 
clinical symptoms (Hong, 2007). Although findings require replication, the relationships 
between the perseverative thought processes of AP and PEP and social anxiety have 
garnered empirical support. In light of these relationships, it is important to further 
develop our understanding of the factors that may aid in the maintenance of perseverative 
thought in social anxiety. Metacognitive processes have gained increasing attention in 
the literature as underlying maintenance factors for perseverative thought in various 
forms of psychopathology. Given the conceptual similarities between worry and AP as 
well as rumination and PEP, a review of literature regarding the role of meta cognition in 
the maintenance of worry and rumination provides a basis for further exploration of 
metacognition in social anxiety. 
4. Metacognition and psychopathology 
Research suggests that perseverative thought is associated with certain forms of 
psychopathology. As mentioned, worry, rumination, and AP/PEP have been linked to 
GAD, depression, and social anxiety respectively. What remains unclear, however, is 
what process, or processes, may explain the presence of this perseverative thinking style. 
In this vein, the construct of metacognition has garnered support in the literature as a 
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maintenance factor for perseverative thought. Metacognition is generally understood to 
be a top-down information processing construct that involves the experiences and 
knowledge we possess about our own cognitive process as well as the regulation of the 
same cognitive processes (Efklides, 2008; Vukman, 2005). Correspondingly, Wells 
proposed a metacognitive model of psychological disorder in which disturbances in 
psychological function are largely a product of "biases in the selection and execution of 
control processes for appraising and coping with thoughts, threats, and emotions" (Fisher 
& Wells, 2009, p. 7). Given the apparent relationship between perseverative thought and 
social anxiety, it is important to examine factors that may provide for the maintenance of 
this thinking style. As mentioned, metacognitive processes help to sustain perseverative 
thought in various forms of psychopathology, notably GAD and depression. It is 
reasonable to suppose that metacognition plays a role in the maintenance of perseverative 
thought in social anxiety. The following is a review of the three major components of 
metacognition and their relevance to worry in GAD and rumination in depression to serve 
as a framework for an examination of metacognition as it relates to AP and PEP in social 
anxiety. Preliminary findings regarding these metacognitive processes in social anxiety 
will also be discussed. 
4.1 Metacognitive knowledge/beliefs 
Metacognitive knowledge is conceptualized as declarative knowledge (and 
beliefs) about our own cognitive processes and refers to knowledge we use to ascertain 
which strategies will help to facilitate goal attainment and the conditions for their use 
(Larkin, 2010). In terms of psychopathology, metacognitive knowledge has been 
explored as the beliefs one holds about the functionality of perseverative thought. That 
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is, models have been proposed in which one chooses (and sustains) perseverative thought 
as a cognitive strategy to address negative thoughts and emotions largely on the basis of 
positive and negative beliefs about the strategy itself (Fisher & Wells, 2009; Wells, 
2007). In light of the mentioned similarities between AP in social anxiety and worry in 
GAD, literature pertaining to metacognitive beliefs in GAD and depression will be 
reviewed in this section as will findings regarding the possible role of metacognitive 
beliefs in social anxiety. 
4.1.1 Metacognitive beliefs and generalized anxiety disorder 
Wells (1995) advanced a metacognitive model of GAD in which the disorder 
results from the presence of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs about the functionality 
of worry. Positive metacognitive beliefs about worry such as "worry allows me to be 
prepared" or "worry helps me anticipate and avoid future problems" perpetuate the 
volitional use of worry as a coping strategy. Negative metacognitive beliefs about worry 
such as "my worries are uncontrollable" or "my worry makes me crazy" sustain the 
process of worry by contributing to the perception of diminished cognitive control and 
experience of worry as potentially harmful. 
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) developed a measure, the Meta-Cognitions 
Questionnaire to examine beliefs about worry. Factor analysis showed five distinct 
dimensions of metacognition in this regard including positive and negative beliefs about 
worry. Results suggested that both positive beliefs about the benefits of worry and 
negative beliefs about the controllability and harmfulness of thoughts independently 
predicted the experience of worry. Wells and Papageorgiou (1998a) extended these 
findings by differentiating between worry and obsessive-compulsive symptoms as they 
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relate to metacognitive processes. Results indicated that, beyond the contribution of 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, positive and negative metacognitive beliefs about 
worry were associated with worry proneness. 
Other researchers have also studied the relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and excessive worry. Francis and Dugas (2004) devised a structured interview to 
assess positive beliefs about worry. Positive beliefs about worry were shown to predict 
worry and that this relationship was unique beyond the contributions of anxiety and 
depressive symptoms. Via factor analysis, Davey and colleagues (1996) identified five 
coherent factors of which three comprised positive consequences and two comprised 
negative consequences of worry. Both positive and negative beliefs about worry were 
independently related to poor psychological outcomes including excessive worry. 
Moreover, individuals who held both positive and negative beliefs about worry scored 
higher on measures of psychopathology than did individuals who endorsed only negative 
beliefs about worry. 
4.1.2 Metacognitive beliefs and anticipatory processing 
The body of literature regarding anticipatory anxiety remains small and, at 
present, there are no known studies examining the relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and anticipatory anxiety in social anxiety specifically. However, given the 
conceptual similarities between worry in GAD and worry-like anticipatory processing 
common to social anxiety, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that, like worry, AP is 
perseverative and maintained by positive and negative metacognitive beliefs. Although 
speculative at this point, there is some preliminary support for the relationship between 
metacognitive beliefs and AP. 
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Although the explicit purpose of the previously referenced Vassilopoulos studies 
on AP in social anxiety (2004, 2005; 2008) was not to examine metacognitive beliefs 
about the functionality of AP, it is reasonable to deduce that metacognitive beliefs 
influence the use of AP in socially anxious individuals based on their results. The use of 
AP as a method of prediction and preparation for socially distressing situations is 
analogous to findings suggesting that worry in GAD is a failed attempt to predict and 
solve future problems (Davey, 1994). Employing AP as a way to predict one's own 
future behavior, others' responses to this behavior, and to develop strategies to address 
problems in the future social event implies the presence of a positive metacognitive belief 
about the functionality of AP. That is, high socially anxious individuals appear to hold 
the positive metacognitive belief that AP allows for the prediction of and preparation for 
future problems in a social situation. Taken a step further, the belief that AP allows one 
to predict and prepare in this way implies that doing so will reduce the likelihood and 
consequences of a negative outcome, otherwise it is a fruitless enterprise. This is 
consistent with findings in the GAD literature regarding positive metacognitive beliefs 
and worry (Freeston, Rhaume, Letarte, & Dugas, 1994; Wells, 2005). 
Research regarding the relationship between AP and negative metacognitive 
beliefs is even more lacking. Findings from the GAD literature indicate that negative 
metacognitive beliefs about worry largely involve a sense that worry is uncontrollable 
and harmful (Wells, 1995,2005). Acknowledging its similarity to worry in GAD, this 
conceptualization is extended to AP in social anxiety with social distress as the specific 
worry referent. Although no empirical research has been conducted to firmly establish 
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this connection, there are some preliminary indications that negative metacognitive 
beliefs are associated with AP. 
At least one recent study investigated the relationship between negative 
metacognitive beliefs and anticipatory anxiety in social anxiety. McEvoy and Perini 
(2009) conducted a group treatment study in which they used attention training as 
proposed by Wells (1990) to compliment cognitive behavioral group therapy and, 
hopefully, reduce dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs, self-focused attention, and 
perseverative thinking in socially anxious individuals. Exploratory analyses conducted as 
one component of the study indicated that reductions in AP were related to overall 
symptom relief as well as changes in metacognitive beliefs as measured by the Meta-
Cognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). Specifically, decreases in 
anticipatory anxiety were associated with reductions in metacognitive beliefs regarding 
the uncontrollability, danger, and need to control thoughts. 
4.1.3 Metacognitive beliefs and depression 
As mentioned above, rumination is associated with depression (Donaldson, et ai., 
2007; Hankin, et ai., 2009; Nolen-Hoeksema, et ai., 2008). Metacognition has been 
implicated in the maintenance of ruminative thought in depression (Thomsen, 2006; 
Wells,2008). A metacognitive model of depression has been proposed in which 
rumination is a maladaptive response to sadness or negative thoughts and is linked to 
positive and negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2001). According to this conceptualization, positive beliefs about the advantages of 
depressive rumination, such as "rumination helps me understand my mistakes" may 
encourage the selection of ruminative thought as a strategy. Further, negative 
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metacognitive beliefs about rumination (e.g., "I cannot control my thoughts; my thoughts 
mean I'm crazy") may lead to the persistence of ruminative thinking by stimulating 
negative affect. 
Subsequent empirical work has generally supported the construction of this 
model. Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) used structural equation modeling to test the 
statistical fit of their model in a clinically depressed sample. Results suggested that 
positive beliefs about rumination are directly related to the experience of rumination 
while negative beliefs about rumination mediate the relationship between rumination and 
depressive symptoms. Watkins and Baracaia (2001) provided further evidence of the link 
between metacognition and rumination. The researchers found that people high in 
rumination were more likely to endorse perceived benefits of rumination than people low 
in rumination with the most frequently reported benefits being: understanding of 
depression, problem-solving, and preventing future mistakes. In another study, negative 
metacognitive beliefs about rumination were predictive of depression when controlling 
for the effects of rumination while rumination was not predictive of depression when 
controlling for negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2009). 
4.1.4 Metacognitive beliefs and post-event processing 
PEP in social anxiety is gaining increased attention, however there is a void in 
the literature with respect to metacognitive beliefs as a possible maintenance factor for 
PEP. As mentioned, depression literature suggests that positive metacognitive beliefs 
about rumination activate perseverative thought and increase the likelihood of its 
selection as a strategy whereas negative metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability 
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and harm of rumination serve to maintain it (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Thomsen, 
2006). Given the conceptual similarity between rumination and PEP, it is reasonable to 
speculate that positive metacognitive beliefs about PEP serve a similar function in social 
anxiety. 
As part of a larger study, Dannahy and Stopa (2007) explored differences in 
positive metacognitive beliefs about PEP between individuals high and low in social 
anxiety. An undergraduate sample was utilized and data collection took place on two 
occasions spaced one week apart. In session 1, participants were asked to engage in an 
impromptu conversation with a stranger while being video recorded. At session 2, 
participants were given instructions identical to those given at session 1. Self-report data 
regarding anxiety, PEP, and metacognition were collected at both sessions. Contrary to 
researcher expectations, no differences were found between high and low socially 
anxious individuals in terms of positive metacognitive beliefs about PEP following a 
socially distressing event. The authors suggest this finding may be an artifact of 
methodology because the measure of metacognition used was not designed to measure 
metacognition in social anxiety specifically. 
McEvoy and colleagues (2009) conducted a treatment study in which they 
examined changes in post-event processing and metacognition during cognitive 
behavioral group therapy for social anxiety. Participants were individuals with clinically 
diagnosed social phobia who completed a 7-week group therapy intervention program 
that involved widely-used CBT techniques such as cognitive restructuring and exposure. 
Data on symptoms of social anxiety, PEP, and metacognition were gathered both pre- and 
post-treatment. Results showed no differences in positive metacognitive beliefs about 
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PEP from pre- to post-treatment. The authors surmised that the stability of positive 
metacognitive beliefs about PEP may be a function of the treatment design. 
Metacognitive beliefs were not directly confronted during the group treatment 
intervention which may explain why the positive metacognitive beliefs about PEP 
persisted. In addition, the use of the MCQ (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) was 
acknowledged as problematic. This instrument was not designed for use with social 
anxiety and is considered to be more sensitive to worry-based cognitive processes than 
rumination. 
Although research in this area is sparse at best, PEP appears to be related to 
negative metacognitive beliefs. For example, results of a previous study suggested that 
high socially anxious individuals were more likely to endorse the belief that their 
thoughts are uncontrollable than their less anxious counterparts (Dannahy & Stopa, 
2007). In a previously mentioned study, McEvoy and Perini (2009) affirmed this 
hypothesis finding that high levels of social anxiety were associated with negative 
metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of PEP as well as the need to 
control thoughts and that these beliefs were reduced from pre- to post-treatment. 
4.1.5 Conclusions and Limitations 
Metacognitive processes have been linked to psychopathology, notably 
depression and generalized anxiety disorder (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Wells, 1995). 
Models have been proposed implicating metacognitive beliefs as a maintenance factor for 
psychopathology via perseverative thought processes such as rumination and worry 
(Davey, et aI., 1996; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). In general, metacognitive beliefs are 
thought to contribute to psychopathology by increasing the likelihood of perseverative 
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thought activation via positive metacognitive beliefs and perpetuating the experience of 
perseverative thought via negative metacognitive beliefs. Whether or not metacognitive 
beliefs are related to the maintenance of perseverative thought in social anxiety remains 
an unsettled issue. However, drawing from findings in the depression and GAD literature 
regarding the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and perseverative thought, there 
is a theoretical basis to posit this relationship given that anticipatory processing and post-
event processing are conceptually similar to worry and rumination respectively. 
Findings from several studies indicate that AP is used as a method of prediction, 
preparation, and problem-solving for future challenges suggesting the presence of 
positive metacognitive beliefs about AP. Only one known study investigated negative 
metacognitive beliefs about AP in social anxiety, characterizing such beliefs as involving 
uncontrollability, danger, and need to control thoughts. The relationship between 
positive metacognitive beliefs and PEP in social anxiety has not been established. Only 
two studies to date have dealt with this issue, neither of which found an effect of positive 
metacognitive beliefs on PEP in social anxiety. On the other hand, the association 
between negative metacognitive beliefs and PEP in high, subclinical social anxiety and 
SAD has garnered some preliminary support as at least three studies have shown a link 
between these two constructs in social anxiety. 
Findings here are promising; however, there are several limitations. First, the 
data are limited to date. There are relatively few empirical studies regarding the role of 
metacognition in psychopathology. Available findings should be replicated and extended 
to build on this promising work. Second, although these theoretical models acknowledge 
the role of metacognitive constructs other than knowledge/beliefs, they do not appear as a 
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major component of the conceptualizations. Future research would likely benefit from 
the inclusion of other metacognitive processes such as monitoring and control. Further, 
there is very little research regarding the nature of perseverative thought in social anxiety 
and even less that involves metacognition as a possible maintenance factor perseverative 
thought. Although there is some work examining the relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs in social anxiety, it is limited at this point. As such, existing findings should be 
replicated and extended so as to provide more empirical support for this work. 
4.2 Metacognitive monitoring 
The second component of metacognition to be discussed, metacognitive 
monitoring, involves the capacity to acknowledge the presence of cognitive processes 
related to task performance and to heuristically evaluate global task progress (Efklides, 
2001; Kahneman, 2003; Nelson & Narens, 1994). This component of meta cognition 
involves the feelings and appraisals about the current state of cognition when presented 
with a task (Efklides, 2008; Wells, 2000). Given the use of perseverative thought as a 
problem-solving strategy aimed at reducing negative affect, it is necessary to examine the 
metacognitive monitoring of this strategy. Metacognitive monitoring processes related to 
anxiety as a general concept and depression will be reviewed in the following section, 
followed by an examination of literature regarding possible metacognitive monitoring in 
social anxiety. 
4.2.1 Metacognitive monitoring in anxiety and depression 
In two related psychometric studies, instruments were developed and/or further 
tested to capture the qualities of metacognition in psychological disorder (MCQ, 
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; MCQ-30, Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). An 
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examination of the factor structure of the related instruments revealed the presence of an 
empirically distinct metacognitive category described as "Cognitive Self-Consciousness." 
This category was suggested to reflect the degree to which an individual focuses on 
his/her cognitive processes, i.e., metacognitive monitoring. The degree to which this 
factor is predictive of emotional distress (anxiety and depression) was investigated in a 
follow-up study of the MCQ-30 (Spada, Mohiyeddini, & Wells, 2008). Results of 
structural equation modeling suggested that Cognitive Self-Consciousness was shown to 
account for a significant amount of variance in depression, but not anxiety scores. 
Interestingly, it was found that cognitive self-consciousness inversely predicted 
depression. It was concluded that depressed individuals may lack an awareness of their 
ruminative thinking styles and thus do not modify them which leads to increased negative 
affect. 
This conclusion was supported by an examination of dysfunctional thinking in 
depression (Sheppard & Teasdale, 2000). Of interest, was whether or not depression can 
be characterized by the presence of stable cognitive schemas as measured by the 
endorsement of dysfunctional attitude statements. The researchers examined patterns of 
responding on a computer task where participants were asked to either agree or disagree 
with attitude statements (neutral and dysfunctional) by striking one of two computer 
keys. It was hypothesized that a mismatch between an individual's schema content and a 
particular attitude statement would result in a longer response time because the individual 
must engage in metacognitive monitoring to "double check" the potential response before 
acting. Results suggested that, compared to non-depressed controls, depressed 
participants showed no slowing of agreements with dysfunctional statements. Further, 
37 
depressed participants showed a virtually identical pattern of responding affirmatively to 
dysfunctional and neutral statements suggesting that depressed individuals treated these 
very different attitudes in a similar fashion. The researchers concluded that this indicated 
an absence of metacognitive monitoring for thoughts that were consistent with 
dysfunctional schemas in depressed individuals. It was further concluded that this lack of 
metacognitive monitoring exacerbates depression as these dysfunctional schemas are 
never reality tested and are accepted as factual self-statements. 
4.2.2 Metacognitive monitoring in social anxiety 
Research suggests a link between anxiety and depression, and the process of 
metacognitive monitoring. It is possible to extend this theoretical link to social anxiety 
specifically. That is, cognitive models of social anxiety indicate that socially anxious 
individuals are hyper-aware of internal processes, including cognition (Clark & Wells, 
1995: Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). This implies an awareness of thought processes that 
can be described as metacognitive monitoring. However, only two studies to date have 
examined the relationship between metacognitive monitoring and social anxiety 
specifically. As part of a larger investigation of PEP in social anxiety, Dannahy and 
Stopa (2007) found that individuals high in social anxiety scored higher on measures of 
cognitive self-consciousness (i.e., metacognitive monitoring) than did their less anxious 
counterparts. Affirming this finding, McEvoy and colleagues (2009) conducted a 
cognitive behavioral group treatment study in which they found that levels of cognitive 
self-consciousness were significantly reduced from pre- to post-treatment in socially 
anxious individuals. Participants were individuals with SAD who completed a 7-week 
course of CBOT that included psychoeducation, exposure and response prevention, 
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cognitive restructuring, and a focus on attention shifting. These interventions were 
utilized to address symptoms of social anxiety, including a specific focus on AP and PEP. 
The researchers detected reductions in PEP following treatment and found that 
metacognitions were less strongly endorsed upon conclusion of the CBGT program. 
4.2.3 Conclusions and limitations 
At present, research regarding metacognitive monitoring in anxiety and 
depression is limited. Acknowledging this, at least one study has shown that depression 
and depressive rumination are associated with decreased metacognitive monitoring. 
Researchers concluded that this decreased metacognitive monitoring impairs the ability to 
modify problematic thinking adaptively. Other research also identified deficits in 
metacognitive monitoring for depressed individuals that were specific to negative attitude 
statements about the self. Thus, it was concluded that these metacognitive monitoring 
deficits were reflective of existing negative self-schemas that rendered the "double-
checking," or monitoring, of negative self-statements unnecessary. There is virtually no 
research regarding the presence and influence of metacognitive monitoring processes in 
social anxiety. At present, only two studies have examined metacognitive monitoring 
specifically in social anxiety, both concluding that social anxiety is associated with high 
levels of metacognitive monitoring. Assessing metacognitive monitoring in social 
anxiety was not the primary objective of either study; however, these findings can be 
reasonably interpreted as preliminary evidence of the relationship between metacognitive 
monitoring and social anxiety. 
Future research should aim to further deconstruct the nature of dysfunctional 
metacognitive monitoring as it relates to depression and rumination. The finding that 
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metacognitive monitoring is not related to anxiety, as measured by a subscale of the 
MCQ-30, is puzzling. Given the body of research implicating self-focused attention to 
cognition in GAD, this finding is counterintuitive. Future research should attempt to 
replicate this finding and more targeted measures of metacognitive monitoring in anxiety 
should be developed to ensure enhanced specificity. In addition, no definitive 
conclusions can be made about the role of meta cognitive monitoring in social anxiety 
given the lack of empirical work in this area. It is necessary to identify whether unique 
patterns of meta cognitive monitoring are present in social anxiety specifically. The 
preliminary findings mentioned above must be extended such that metacognitive 
monitoring ofperseverative thought in social anxiety is a primary goal of the research 
endeavor. 
4.3 Metacognitive control 
Research suggests that metacognitive beliefs and metacognitive monitoring 
contribute to the link between perseverative thought and psychopathology. In this sense, 
the third component of metacognition, metacognitive control, is also of interest. 
According to Efklides (2008), metacognitive control is the volitional use of strategies to 
control ones cognitive processes. In the context of psychological disorder, metacognitive 
control strategies are described as attempts to control cognitive processes as a means of 
regulating negative affect (Wells, 2000). Selective attention (SA) is thought to be a 
component of metacognitive control and refers to a top-down control process that is 
effortful and is suggested to rely on the inhibition of non-preferred or extraneous stimuli 
(Umilta & Stablum, 1998). Thus, inhibitory control (IC) is a central feature of selective 
attention and is an important metacognitive control function which allows an individual 
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to effortfully disengage from task-irrelevant mental operations that serve to interfere with 
efficient cognitive processing (Larkin, 2010). Given limited research regarding 
metacognitive control and social anxiety specifically, the following section will begin 
with a review of metacognitive control processes associated with perseverative thought in 
GAD and depression, namely selective attention/inhibitory control. This review will be 
followed by an examination of preliminary findings regarding metacognitive control 
processes in social anxiety. 
4.3.1 Metacognitive control and worry 
Selective attention and inhibitory control (IC) are interrelated processes that 
have been associated with activity in the prefrontal cortex (Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
Further, research has found that elevated activity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is 
associated with generalized anxiety disorder (Hoehn-Saric, Schlund, & Wong, 2004). In 
addition, Hoehn-Saric and colleagues (2005) used a worry induction technique to observe 
the effects of worry on cerebral blood flow to the prefrontal cortex in a non-anxious 
sample. Results indicated that worry was associated with increased activity in the PFC 
and decreased activity in the amygdala. The researchers interpreted this finding as 
corroboration for the avoidance hypothesis of worry as it appears the increased PFC 
activity is associated with cognitive function while activity in the amygdala is affect-
related. In another recent study, Price and Mohlman (2007) examined the relationship 
between inhibitory control and worry in a GAD sample. Participants were administered a 
Stroop task in which they were presented with color names printed in an incongruent 
color of ink and were asked to report the color of the ink thus requiring them to inhibit 
reporting the written color name. The researchers found that Stroop task performance 
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was positively correlated with measures of worry for individuals with GAD. This is not 
consistent with previous work suggesting a deficit of IC, however, the current study did 
not utilize emotionally-laden stimuli suggesting that performances on emotional Stroop 
tasks do not generalize to non-emotional tasks. The authors interpreted these findings as 
evidence that, within the context of GAD, increased inhibitory control is associated with 
more severe symptomatology. That is, GAD is not characterized by a deficit in inhibitory 
control, but rather is associated with a failure to utilize IC in adaptive ways. 
4.3.2 Metacognitive control and depression 
As with GAD, depression appears to be associated with differential functioning of 
attention. It has been shown that depression is associated with attentional biases 
(Craighead, Ritschel, et aI., 2008). These attentional biases have been examined as 
related to dysfunctions in IC processes. Joorman (2004) used a negative affective 
priming task to investigate the inhibitory control functioning during processing of 
emotional material in a depressed sample. Results suggested that depressed individuals 
failed to show a negative priming effect in the processing of negative stimuli. That is, 
depressed individuals did not appear to exert IC for irrelevant negative stimuli, even 
when primed to do so. This may point to a tendency for depressed individuals to have 
difficulty disengaging their attention from negative stimuli (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, 
& Joorrnann, 2004). Lending support to this hypothesis, one study used an affective 
shifting task to examine neuropsychological differences in depressed versus non-
depressed individuals (Murphy et aI., 1999). More specifically, one component of the 
study was designed to observe inhibitory control processes in depression and whether 
mood-congruent attentional biases were present during the affective shifting task. 
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Results suggested that depressed individuals showed an impaired ability to shift the focus 
of attention away from negative affective (i.e., mood-congruent) material. This may 
account for the apparent inability of individuals with depression to disengage from mood-
congruent cognitive rumination. 
4.3.3 Metacognitive control and social anxiety 
As described earlier, social anxiety is associated with the self-focused thought 
processes of post-event processing and anticipatory anxiety. Similar to rumination and 
worry, these thought processes appear to be perseverative in nature. It is important, then, 
to examine attentional control processes such as selective attentionlinhibitory control that 
have been linked to other forms ofperseverative thought (i.e., worry and depression) and 
may be associated with this perseverative thinking style in social anxiety. In this vein 
Amir and colleagues (2003) conducted a study in which they examined whether attention 
disengagement difficulties, i.e. inhibitory control, were associated with social anxiety. 
The researchers used a modified cued target paradigm developed to study covert shifts in 
attention. In particular, participants were presented with emotionally valenced (positive 
and social threat) and neutral stimuli as cues during "valid" and "invalid" trials and 
response times were measured. Socially anxious individuals garnered longer response 
latencies when identifying invalidly cued targets following social threat words. These 
results support the hypothesis that socially anxious individuals have difficulty 
disengaging (or inhibiting) attention from social threat words. In another study, Buckner, 
Maner, and Schmidt (20 1 0) used an eye tracking paradigm to investigate attentional 
processes in social anxiety. Similar to the Amir study, the researchers were interested in 
selective attention in social anxiety regarding socially threatening stimuli, in this case 
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facial photos (happy, disgust, neutral). Individuals high in social anxiety were found to 
exhibit slower disengagement from negative social cues (disgust faces) relative to 
individuals low in social anxiety. According to the authors, the ability to effortfully 
disengage attention from social threat information may serve as protection against social 
anxiety, while difficulty with disengagement likely serves to maintain and/or exacerbate 
the anxious experience. 
At least one study has examined the neural bases of social anxiety (P. Goldin, 
Manber, Hakimi, Canli, & Gross, 2009). fMRI technology was used to examine neural 
responses to social threat in socially anxious individuals. In particular, the researchers 
were interested in examining the regulatory functioning of socially anxious individuals 
when presented with socially threatening stimuli. Participants were asked to implement 
cognitive-linguistic regulation of their emotional response when presented with social-
threat (harsh faces) physical-threat (violent scenes), and neutral stimuli. Compared to 
controls, socially anxious individuals showed reduced coordination of cognitive control 
circuitry during regulation of attention during social threat. Socially anxious individuals 
showed a differential pattern of activity in response to social threat in which medial PFC 
activity was enhanced while dorsolateral PFC activity was attenuated. This reciprocal 
relationship is thought to be reflective of emotion-cognitive interactions. These findings 
suggest an impaired ability for socially anxious individuals to implement 
cognitive/attention regulation strategies during (perceived) social threat conditions. 
Schmidt and colleagues (2009) conducted a study in which they examined the 
effects of attention training on symptoms of social anxiety. Participants were social 
phobics who were randomly assigned to either an attention training condition or a control 
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condition. The training component was a dot-probe task that was designed to promote 
the disengagement of attention from social threat (disgusted faces). Symptoms of social 
anxiety were assessed on three occasions: pre-treatment, post-treatment, and 4-month 
follow-up. Results showed that, self-reported symptoms of social anxiety were 
significantly reduced at post-treatment and follow-up. Further, 72% of the social phobics 
in the attention training condition no longer met DSM-IV criteria for SAD at post-
treatment and, and at follow-up 64% remained sub-threshold. Goldin, Ramel, and Gross 
(2009) examined the effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction on the neural 
correlates of self-referential processing in social phobics. Participants were asked to 
engage in a self-referential processing task designed to facilitate self-endorsement of trait 
descriptions (positive and negative) both pre- and post-treatment. fMRI analyses showed 
decreased medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity and increased activity in regions 
associated with attention regulation (i.e., left inferior parietal lobule, medial precuneus) 
which corroborates the hypothesis that treatment may have facilitated enhanced 
attentional control. 
4.3.4 Conclusions and limitations 
According to Borkovec' s (1994) avoidance model of worry, the avoidance of 
threatening emotional content is, in part, a product of preferentially (and effortfully) 
allocating attentional resources away from threatening material and toward verbal-
linguistic material, i.e. worry. The studies referenced above appear to support this claim 
by 1) Providing evidence of increased activity in the prefrontal cortex associated with 
inhibitory control for individuals with GAD and 2) Using a modified Stroop task to 
demonstrate that individuals with GAD may deploy inhibitory control in maladaptive 
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ways. In addition, there is an apparent relationship between inhibitory control 
dysfunction and depression. For depressed individuals, there is evidence of an impaired 
ability to disengage attention from negative affectively-laden material that is congruent 
with the predominant negative mood state. Further, research has shown that social 
anxiety is associated with an impaired ability to disengage attention from negative 
stimuli. Studies examining the neural bases of social anxiety have also supported this 
hypothesis as unique activity in brain regions associated with attention regulation has 
been found in socially anxious individuals. In addition, treatments that include attention 
training and/or attention re-focusing have resulted in the improvement of attentional 
control. Given that perseverative thought is characterized by a failure to disengage 
attention from a repetitive cognitive process, these findings may have implications for the 
maintenance of AP and PEP in social anxiety. 
Although these findings are convincing, more research is needed to further 
delineate these relationships. Results showing that increased activity in the PFC is 
associated with worry are compelling; however, it is unclear what mechanisms are 
responsible for this activity. For example, it is possible that the process of worry might 
account for the increased activity irrespective of inhibitory control. Future research 
should clarify the relationship between worry, activity in the PFC, and inhibitory control. 
In addition, there is no current agreement in the literature about the nature of the 
relationship between metacognitive control and worry (Price & Mohlman, 2007). For 
example, Mathews and McLeod (1985) suggest an alternative explanation in that the 
attentional bias associated with worry is involuntary and thus unrelated to control 
processes. A limitation of attentional control research for both GAD and depressed 
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populations in this regard is the reliance on reaction times for attention tasks like the 
Stroop. There are certainly other explanations for why an individual may register a 
delayed reaction time on a task like this. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that 
depressed individual may simply be engaging in perseverative thought during the task 
regardless of the affectively laden stimuli. One limitation of the findings regarding social 
anxiety specifically is that it is not clear whether the stimuli used to approximate social 
threat (e.g., disgusted faces) in some of this work adequately represents the construct for 
which it serves as a proxy. Future research should utilize observations of actual social 
situations to determine whether these results generalize to the "real world." In addition, 
given that attentional biases are common across pathologies (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 
2005), future research should determine whether there is a pattern of attentional control 
processes unique to social anxiety. 
5. A proposed meta cognitive model of social anxiety 
There is broad empirical support for the cognitive nature of social anxiety. 
However, existing models of social anxiety concentrate on the content of cognition rather 
than the overall style of thinking. In addition, factors that maintain this maladaptive style 
of thinking in social anxiety remain unclear. Given the relative lack of research in these 
areas specific to social anxiety, research on worry in GAD and rumination in depression 
provide the best available empirical basis for this examination. Although literature 
regarding perseverative thought in mental disorder is garnering more attention in the 
literature, as is the role of metacognition, these areas of research remain in development. 
Work specific to social anxiety is even less mature. As such, the proposed model does 
not presume etiology, rather, it is an examination of variables that may aid in the 
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maintenance of social anxiety and, perhaps, help to characterize it. Because research in 
this area is sparse, several components of the model are somewhat speculative. Still, the 
conceptual similarities between cognitive processes associated with GAD and depression, 
and cognitive processes linked to social anxiety lend credence to this speculation. 
Further, the lack of research in this area, in and of itself, necessitates such speculation 
and, indeed, provides the very basis for such an investigation. 
In general, the proposed theoretical model hypothesizes that socially anxious 
individuals engage in perseverative thinking both pre and post social event to cope with 
negative thought content and emotions related to the social experience, and that various 
metacognitive processes maintain this maladaptive style of thinking (See Figure 1). Prior 
to a feared social event, the socially anxious individual engages in AP (Hinrichsen & 
Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2004). In the current model, AP is conceptualized as a 
domain-specific worry process and is thus considered perseverative. Following the 
feared social event, the socially anxious individual engages in PEP, a "post-mortem" 
review of his/her performance during a social experience that focuses on perceived 
failures (Rachman, et aI., 2000). Though specific to social experiences, PEP is a thinking 
style similar to rumination in depression and, as such, is presumed to be perseverative. 
These constructs are assumed, in the current model, to be conceptually similar and highly 
inten·elated. That is, AP and PEP are conceptualized as two distinct components of a 
larger perseverative thought construct. Research has shown that worry and rumination 
are primarily distinguished by temporal focus (McEvoy, et aI., 2010). Because AP and 
PEP are conceptually similar to worry and rumination, it is reasonable to speculate that, 
like worry and rumination, AP and PEP are distinguished, in part, by temporal focus. 
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However, given the qualitative differences between worry and rumination and research 
suggesting that the two constructs maintain relative independence, the current model 
assumes that AP and PEP are similarly distinguished from one another. That is, AP is 
future-oriented worry about a social event in which possible social challenges are 
considered and anxiety is stimulated. 
Figure J: Conceptual Metacognitive Model of Social Anxiety 
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As articulated by Clark and Wells (1995), the socially anxious individual becomes 
anxious as she starts to think about the social event because she begins producing 
negative images of herself in the future situation and tends to predict negative 
performance and, ultimately, rejection. PEP, on the other hand, is past-oriented 
rumination about a perceived social failure which entails prolonged thought specific to 
these perceived failures and is associated with the stimulation of anxiety. More 
specifically, the socially anxious individual broods over the social event and focuses on 
cognitive content that is guided by negative thoughts and anxious feelings that occurred 
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during the social experience (Dannahy & Stopa, 2007). In addition, PEP involves the 
biased retrieval of perceived negative information about themselves from the social 
expenence (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). Further, this selective retrieval is theorized to 
lead to the reshaping or distortion of memories such that the recollection of the event is 
eventually reconstructed to fit the socially anxious individual's negative self-view 
(Brozovich & Heimberg, 2008). PEP, then, is related to perseverative thought about 
what did happen in a past social experience versus AP which is centered around what 
might happen in a future social experience. So while it is temporal focus, in some ways, 
that distinguishes the constructs, there are additional qualitative differences between AP 
and PEP. 
In response to a trigger (e.g., a negative thought or emotion), the socially 
anxious individual activates positive metacognitive beliefs about AP. For example 
"worrying about the upcoming social event allows me to predict and prepare for potential 
problems" is a positive metacognitive belief about the functionality of AP. Further, the 
belief that allows for the prediction of and preparation for potential social "threats" may 
encourage a behavioral response, such as avoidance. Avoiding the social "threat," then, 
reinforces the positive metacognitive belief that AP decreases social threat probability. 
These types of beliefs encourage the use of AP as a coping strategy which, in turn, 
maintains the perseverative thinking style and consequently the negative affect. In 
addition to positive metacognitive beliefs, negative metacognitive beliefs serve to 
maintain anticipatory processing. The current model suggests that, similar to worry in 
GAD, negative metacognitive beliefs about AP maintain the AP because it is viewed as 
uncontrollable and harmful which stimulates an anxious response and, in turn, more AP. 
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A socially anxious individual who views AP as uncontrollable may experience increased 
negative affect due to this lack of perceived control. Moreover, the metacognitive belief 
that AP is harmful likely stimulates anxiety and maintains perseverative thought. 
Following the social event, and in response to an ambiguous trigger, post-event 
processing is initiated due positive metacognitive beliefs held about PEP. For example, 
the negative thought "I embarrassed myself' may trigger the metacognitive belief that 
PEP promotes an understanding of why the perceived failure occurred. This, in turn, 
stimulates the use of PEP as a coping strategy. Similar to rumination in depression, 
negative metacognitive beliefs about PEP concern the uncontrollability, harm, and 
meaning of PEP. These negative metacognitive beliefs allow PEP to persist because 
there is a perceived lack of control and a sense of harm which increases negative affect 
and precipitates more PEP. 
In addition to metacognitive beliefs about AP and PEP, the proposed model 
asserts that perseverative thought in social anxiety exists as a function of poor 
metacognitive monitoring and control processes. As stated above, metacognitive 
monitoring involves feelings and appraisals about cognition and the heuristic evaluation 
of progress toward a goal (Efklides, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Wells, 2000). Because the 
goals of the socially anxious individual (i.e., control/prevention of negative thoughts and 
emotion) are never attained, the current model proposes that socially anxious individuals 
suffer from impaired metacognitive monitoring abilities. Data regarding metacognitive 
monitoring in psychopathology are limited and of mixed results. In light of the shortage 
of research in this area, the current model only supposes disruptions in metacognitive 
monitoring processes for socially anxious individuals, but does not assume the nature of 
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these disruptions. It is possible that social anxiety is, like depression, inversely related to 
metacognitive monitoring. Alternatively, social anxiety may be associated with 
excessive monitoring and awareness of thoughts, leading to increased negative affect. It 
is dysfunction in metacognitive monitoring, generally, that the current model assumes to 
be linked with social anxiety. 
In addition, metacognitive control processes are also implicated in the 
maintenance ofperseverative thought and related social anxiety. Previous work indicates 
that metacognitive control involves the deliberate use of strategies to control cognition 
(Efklides, 2008; Perfect & Schwartz, 2002). In particular, selective attention/inhibitory 
control is proposed as a metacognitive control mechanism that perpetuates perseverative 
thinking when impaired. The current model suggests that the maintenance of 
perseverative thought in social anxiety is, in part, a function of an impaired ability to 
appropriately disengage attention from maladaptive thought processes. Both GAD and 
depression studies implicate problems with metacognitive control in the maintenance of 
perseverative thought and, by extension, negative affect. 
The current study 
The relationship between perseverative thought and various forms of 
psychopathology is well-established in the literature (Borkovec, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991). Further, metacognitive processes have been implicated in the maintenance of this 
perseverative thinking style in psychopathology (Wells, 1995; Wells & Matthews, 1994). 
The proposed model considers the role of perseverative thought in social anxiety 
specifically, both pre and post social event. As with psychopathology more generally, the 
proposed model implicates metacognitive processes in the perpetuation of maladaptive 
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perseverative thinking. The current study is an attempt to establish, empirically, the 
hypothesized relationships presented in the proposed model. 
The first aim of the current study was to establish relationships among the 
variables of interest. First, it is important to replicate the previously cited findings that 
social anxiety is associated with perseverative thought (Rachman, et aI., 2000; 
Vassilopoulos, 2004). Correspondingly, the relationship between anticipatory processing 
and social anxiety was tested, and it was expected that AP will show a significant and 
positive correlation with social anxiety. Post-event processing was expected to share a 
significant positive correlation with social anxiety. Because there appears to be some 
conceptual confusion about the boundary between these two constructs, it was important 
to assess the degree to which these two constructs are independent or, alternatively, 
interrelated. To this end, we hypothesized that AP and PEP would be significantly 
related to one another, but would constitute separate distinct constructs. As a rule of 
thumb, correlations above a value of 0.8 signal a possible problem with multicollinearity 
(Kline, 2005). The correlation between AP and PEP was expected to be strong and 
positive; however, it was not expected to exceed this value. Beyond this rule of thumb, it 
is important to examine the shared variance between AP and PEP as they relate to social 
anxiety so as to provide more statistical clarity. The links between the three 
metacognitive processes (beliefs, monitoring, control) and AP were tested as well. 
Significant positive correlations were expected to exist between metacognitive beliefs 
and AP as well as metacognitive control and AP. The correlation between metacognitive 
monitoring and AP was expected to be significant. Although findings are mixed in the 
literature regarding metacognitive monitoring and perseverative thought, the valence of 
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this correlation was expected to be positive given the self-focused nature of cognition in 
social anxiety. The potential link between the three metacognitive processes and PEP 
was tested. Metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive control 
were expected to share significant positive correlations with PEP. Finally, all three 
components of metacognition were expected to be associated with social anxiety and 
were tested. Specifically, metacognitive beliefs, control, and monitoring were expected 
to show a significant and positive correlation with social anxiety. 
A hypothesized model was presented in Figure 1 to provide conceptual context 
for the testable model provided in Figure 2. That is, the model presented in Figure 2 is a 
testable proxy of the more broadly defined conceptual model presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 2: Hypothesized Path Model 
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The second aim of this study was to examine the relationship among metacognitive 
processes, perseverative thought, and social anxiety. Whereas the analyses mentioned 
above establish and/or affirm relationships among the variables of interest, this analysis 
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tested the statistical cogency of the hypothesized model overall, as well as the 
hypothesized causal pathways within the overall model. The direct relationships 
mentioned above were tested within the context of the path model and were expected to 
be significant. In terms of indirect relationships, the first path we tested was the 
relationship between metacognitive beliefs and social anxiety, via anticipatory 
processing. Based on research regarding the relationship between anticipatory processing 
and social anxiety (Vassilopoulos, 2004) and findings implicating metacognitive beliefs 
in the maintenance of worry in GAD (Wells, 2005), this path was hypothesized to be 
significant. Second, given the apparent relationship between social anxiety and PEP 
(Rachman, et aI., 2000) and research implicating metacognitive beliefs in the 
maintenance of rumination in depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), an indirect 
relationship was hypothesized between metacognitive beliefs and social anxiety through 
the intermediate variable of post-event processing. Further, research points toward a link 
between metacognitive monitoring and perseverative thought in psychopathology 
generally (Cartwright-Hatton et aI., 2004; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). 
Preliminary findings suggest a similar relationship between metacognitive monitoring 
and perseverative thought in social anxiety (Dannahy & Stopa, 2007; McEvoy, et aI., 
2009). As such, it was hypothesized that metacognitive monitoring will share an indirect 
relationship with social anxiety, via AP and PEP. Next, based on research indicating a 
relationship between the attentional control and perseverative thought (e.g. Joormann, 
2004; Price & Mohlman, 2007) and preliminary findings linking attentional control 
problems to social anxiety (Amir, et aI., 2003; P. Goldin, et aI., 2009), an indirect 
relationship was hypothesized between metacognitive (attentional) control and social 
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anxiety through the intermediate variables of AP and PEP. Each path and the overall fit 
were tested for significance using path analysis. 
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METHODS 
Recruitment and process 
The sample was comprised of undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
university. Participants were recruited from the undergraduate psychology subject pool 
using the computer-based research participation system, Sona Systems. Incentive, in the 
form of research participation credit for the psychology course was provided for 
participation in the study for eligible participants. IRB approved flyers advertising the 
study were posted on billboards in various locations on campus. In addition, researchers 
provided information about the study to students in introductory psychology classes via a 
brief talk. Participants were tested in groups in classroom settings. Prior to testing, each 
participant reviewed and completed an informed consent form. Following the consent 
process, each participant completed a series of self-report measures (the specifics of these 
self-report measures can be found in the Measures section). In total, this process took 
approximately one to one and a half hours to complete. 
Sample Size 
There exists no strict formula for arriving at an ideal sample size using a path 
analysis approach. Consequently, to determine an appropriate sample size, previous path 
analysis literature was reviewed. Some literature suggests a minimum of 100 subjects to 
in order to obtain a sound model estimate (Anderson & Gerbing, 1984). However, other 
literature advocates a more model specific approach stipUlating that for every free 
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parameter and every observed variable, 5 to 10 subjects are necessary to ensure an 
accurate model estimation (Benter, 1993). In light of the mentioned standards and 
because there are 12 free parameters and 6 observed variables, between 100 and 180 
participants is indicated. The current sample comprised 154 participants. 
Measures 
Anticipatory Processing Questionnaire (Vassilopoulos, 2004). The APQ is a self-
report measure of anticipatory processing as it relates to the experience of social anxiety. 
It is an 18-item questionnaire that was developed in line with Clark and Wells' model of 
social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995). Respondents are presented with an introductory 
paragraph that states "According to research findings, most people experience anxiety 
before entering a social event-activity (such as a party or interaction with unknown 
people). Have you experienced anxiety before a social event in the past few months? If 
yes, then please answer the questions below." A visual analogue scale is used and all 
items are scored from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely) with the exception of item 17 
(yes/no). The measure yields a composite score for anticipatory processing which has 
been shown to be associated with measures of social anxiety (Vassilopoulos, 2004). 
According to Vassipolous (2004), the APQ shows good internal consistency ( Cronbach's 
a = .91). 
Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). The ACQ is a self-report 
measure of attentional control. It comprises 20 items, tapping individual differences in 
attentional control. Items are rated by respondents on a 4-point Likert-type scale 
(1 =almost never; 2=sometimes; 3=often; 4=always). Item scores are summed to yield a 
total score of attentional control. Of particular note, high scores reflect good attentional 
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control. In terms of psychometrics, the ACQ shows good internal consistency 
(Cronbach's ex = .86) and is positively related to indices of positive emotionality and 
inversely related to indices of negative emotionality, such as trait anxiety (Claes, 
Vertommen, Smits, & Bijttebier, 2009). 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996). The BDI-II is 
a 21-item self-report measure that assesses the severity of somatic, affective, and 
cognitive symptoms of depression in an adult population. Clinical interpretation of 
scores is as follows: 0-13 indicates minimal depression, 14-19 indicates mild depression, 
20-28 indicates moderate depression, 29-63 indicates severe depression. The BDI-II has 
excellent internal consistency as it yields alphas ranging from 0.92 to 0.93. 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). The MCQ is 
a 65-item self-report measure design to assess beliefs about worry and intrusive thoughts. 
It is based on Well's self-regulatory model of vulnerability to psychological disorder 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994). The scale consists of five subscales: positive beliefs about 
worry, beliefs about controllability and danger, beliefs about cognitive competence, 
general negative beliefs, and cognitive self-consciousness. Respondents are asked how 
much they agree with each item on a four-point Likert-type scale. The subscales of the 
MCQ demonstrated adequate to good internal consistency with alphas ranging from .72 
to .89, adequate to very good test-retest reliability, and good convergent validity 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) . 
Post-event Processing Questionnaire (Rachman, et aI., 2000). The PEP is a self-
report measure developed to index post-event rumination in social anxiety. This measure 
consists of 13 items designed to gauge how much and how often respondents engage in 
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post-event processing following an anxiety-provoking social event in the last few months. 
The PEP uses a 100-point visual analogue scale with 0 indicating low levels of PEP and 
100 indicating severe levels of PEP which yields a total score based on all 13 items. The 
PEP is correlated with measures of social anxiety and an investigation of the 
psychometric properties of the instrument revealed good internal consistency, with a 
Cronbach's alpha of .85 (Rachrnan, et aI., 2000). 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989). 
The SP AI is a 45-item self-report questionnaire that was empirically developed to 
measure social anxiety. It measures cognitive, somatic, and behavioral aspects of social 
anxiety across situations and settings. Each item is rated for frequency on a seven-point 
scale ranging from 0 (never) for to 6 (always). The SPAl contains two subscales: social 
phobia and agoraphobia. Subscale scores are calculated by summing the items that 
constitute each subscale. Nonnative information is available for both clinical and student 
samples. The SP AI shows good internal consistency with alphas ranging from. 94 to .96 
for the social phobia subscale and .85 to .86 for the agoraphobia subscale. The SP AI also 
shows good test-retest reliability, good convergent validity, and adequate discriminant 
validity (Beidel, Turner, Stanley, & Dancu, 1989; Turner, Stanley, Beidel, & Bond, 
1989). 
Internal Consistency for the Current Sample 
In order to assess the degree to which each scale or sub scale used in the study 
measures a unitary construct in the current sample, Cronbach's alpha coefficient values 
were evaluated. In this sample, the SP AI evidenced excellent internal consistency 
(Chronbach's alpha = 0.98). The Anticipatory Processing Questionnaire produced a 
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Cronbach's alpha value of 0.92 which indicates excellent reliability. The Post Event 
Processing Questionnaire demonstrated good internal consistency with a Cronbach's 
alpha value of 0.89. The Attentional Control Scale showed good internal consistency 
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.85). The metacognitive beliefs composite produced by the Meta-
Cognitions Questionnaire subscales measuring positive beliefs about worry and beliefs 
about controllability and danger demonstrated excellent reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 
0.92). Finally, the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire subscale measuring cognitive self-
consciousness evidenced acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79). The 
Beck Depression Inventory-II showed excellent reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.90) 
Statistical Analyses 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to evaluate the utility of data obtained from 
the sample. It is important to ascertain whether any of the demographic variables hold 
strong relationships with the constructs included in study analyses. Correlational 
analyses were run to test these potentially problematic relationships. In addition, the 
extent to which each measurement instrument or subscale included in this study measures 
a unitary construct (i.e., internal consistency) was evaluated via Chronbach's alpha 
coefficients. 
In order to replicate previous findings that established direct relationships among 
the variables of interest included in the model, Pearson Product Moment Correlations 
were run for each expected relationship. In addition, although not the primary purpose of 
the current study, replicating previous findings of these direct relationships provides 
statistical justification for testing a more comprehensive model including potential 
indirect relationships within such a model. 
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Path analysis was chosen to test the proposed theoretical model and the AMOS 
version 20.0 Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) software package was used to conduct 
the analysis (IBM SPSS, 2012). This analytic strategy was chosen because offers 
multiple distinct advantages relative to other statistical analysis procedures. For example, 
path analysis (as a variant of SEM) allows for the evaluation of the entire system of 
variables. More specifically, if it is a good fit for the data, the hypothesized model 
"argues for the plausibility of postulated relations among variables" (Byrne, 2001, p. 1). 
This method involves the examination of multiple relationships, including direct and 
indirect pathways, at the same time (Mezo & Francis, 2012). Moreover, this technique 
offers the ability to account for shared variance among variables included in the model. 
Path analysis allows for testing these relationships in a unitary model, rather than in 
multiple separate analyses as is the case with other methods, such as multiple regression 
(Adelson, 2012). This is advantageous relative to the validity of the specified construct, 
as well as the reliability of measurement. It also reduces the impact of error related to 
conducting multiple, separate analyses. In this context, path analysis includes 
measurement error variables for the variables within the model (Kline, 2005). In the 
current model, level of social anxiety symptoms was the dependent variable. 
Metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive (attentional) control 
served as the initial predictor variables. The perseverative thought constructs of AP and 
PEP were the hypothesized intermediate variables. The extent to which the hypothesized 
model is a good fit for the data was evaluated with the use of various fit indexes. In 
addition, direct relationships were tested within the context of the path model. Of 
particular importance, indirect relationships between predictor variables (metacognition) 
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and the dependent variable (social anxiety symptoms) via intermediate variables 
(perseverative thought constructs) were tested within the path model. The significance of 
these relationships was evaluated using the Sobel Test (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In 
addition, comparison models were run to evaluate the performance of the hypothesized 
model relative to other models. Specifically, given the high comorbidity between social 
anxiety and depressive symptoms, comparison models were run that included depression 
as an additional variable. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptives 
The final sample was comprised of 154 undergraduate participants who ranged in 
age from 18 to 30 years old. The mean age for the sample was 20.83 (SD=3.24). The 
modal age for the sample was 20 years. Of the 154 participants, 33 (21.4%) were male 
and 121 (78.6%) were female. The sample included (33.1%) freshmen, 37 (24.0%) 
sophomores, 33 (21.4%) juniors, 32 (20.8%) seniors, and 1 (0.6%) 5th year senior. In 
terms of ethnic composition, the sample was comprised of 105 (68.2%) European 
Americans, 30 (19.5%) African Americans, 9 (5.8%) Asian Americans, 1 (0.6%) Latino 
American, 8 (5.2%) self-identified multiethnic individuals, and one (0.6%) participant 
who declined to specify his/her ethnicity. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Demographic Variables 
Each demographic variable (age, ethnicity, academic year, sex) was included in a 
correlation matrix to determine whether there were any problematic relationships among 
demographic variables and variables of interest in the model. No significant relationships 
were detected between any of the variables included in the model and any of the 
mentioned demographic variables. There was, however, a noticeable imbalance in sex 
distribution with a substantially higher number of females in the sample (78.6%). 
Although sex as a variable was not statistically associated with other variables of interest 
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in the model, the imbalance is substantial and worthy of attention nevertheless. As such, 
a comparison model was run to investigate whether sex exerts a significant amount of 
influence on the data. 
Table 1: Correlations Betvveen Demographic Variables and Path Model Variables 
Metacognitive Metacognitive Anticipatory Post- Social 
Monitoring Control Processing Event Anxiety 
Processing 
Age 0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.06 0.13 
Sex -0.03 -0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.01 
Academic 0.07 0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.07 
Year 
Ethnicity 0.04 0.001 -0.06 0.05 -0.15 
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.01 
Analyses: Aim 1 
Correlational analyses were conducted so as to statistically justify exploration of 
the data with path analysis . Anticipatory processing was positively related to social 
anxiety (r=0.42, p<O.OOI ). This is consistent with findings by Vassilopoulos (2004, 
2005; 2008) linking anticipatory processing to social anxiety. Post-event processing was 
related positively to social anxiety (r=0.26, p=O.OOI). This result was expected and is a 
replication ofRachman's (2000) work that established a relationship between PEP and 
social anxiety. As expected, anticipatory processing and post-event processing were 
positively con-elated (r=0.67, p<O.OOI) but did not exceed 0.8, the value which signals 
possible problems with multicollinearity. Although this threshold was not crossed, the 
relationship is substantial, thus AP and PEP were covaried in the final model. 
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Table 2: Correlalions Belween Variables Included in the Path Model' 
Metacognitive 
Beliefs 
Metacognitive 
Monitoring 
Metacognitive 
Control 
Anticipatory 
Processing 
Post-Event 
Processing 
Metacognitive Metacognitive Anticipatory 
Monitoring Control Processing 
0.43** -0.27** 0.55** 
-0.06 0.33** 
-0.18* 
** p < 0.05; * p < 0.01 
Post-
Event 
Processing 
0.57** 
0.31** 
-0.18* 
0.67** 
Social 
Anxiety 
0.28** 
0.10 
-0.23** 
0.42** 
0.26** 
Of the tlu'ee metacognitive constructs, two were significantly correlated with social 
anxiety: Metacognitive beliefs (r=0.28, p<O.OOI) and metacognitive/attentional control 
(1= -0.23 , P =0.004). These results were expected and comport with previous findings 
(e.g. , DatUlahy & Stopa, 2007). Consistent with previous research (e.g. , McEvoy et ai , 
2009), all three metacognitive constructs were significantly c01Teiated with anticipatory 
processing: metacognitive beliefs (1'=0.55, p<O.OO 1), metacognitive 
awareness/monitoring (1'=0.33, p<O.OOI), and metacognitive/attentional control (1'= -0.18, 
p=0.028). Lastly, each metacognitive construct was significantly related to post-event 
processing: metacognitive beliefs (r=0.57, p<O.OOI), metacognitive 
awareness/monitoring (r=0.31, p<O.OOl), and metacognitive/attentional control 
J Variables described reflect scores on continuous measures of each construct and are not intended to be 
viewed as diagnostic representations. 
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(r= -0.18,p=0.022). In general, these results constitute replications of findings from 
previous research (e.g., Dannahy & Stopa, 2007). 
Table 3: Descriptive Information/or Variables Included in the Path Model 
1etacogn . i\fe ry e acognitive r,. etacognitive Anticipat 0 ry Post· So 'al 
r.. on' oring 0 ·ro l Be liefs Processing f~'e Aru:i€t'( 
Processin,g 
Me.1n 19.3& 4'9.14 7124 554.31 351.03 49.09 
Range 38.00 416 .00 74110 1470.00 920.00 BS.OO 
Minimum 0.00 2.8.00 38.00 10.00 20.00 2.00 
Maximum .,8.0 7 .00 11 :2.00 148.{I.00 9 o. 137.0 
Analyses: Aim 2 
Model Fit 
The principal question of interest for this study is whether or not the model 
presented in Figure 2 was a good fit for the data. In addition, significant pathways were 
explored to ascertain the extent to which metacognitive processes affected levels of social 
anxiety by way of perseverative thought constructs (i.e. , anticipatory and post-event 
processing). A visual depiction of the path model is presented in Figure 3. The 
CMIN/DF is the relative chi-square, i.e. an index of how much the fit of data to model 
has been reduced by dropping paths and should be non-significant (Byrne, 2001). More 
specifically, this fit index relies on the premise that relationships among the variables 
included in the model are implied. The relative chi-square measures the degree to which 
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the tested relationships in the researcher' s model comport with the implied relationships 
in the "null" model (Adelson). 
In short, a failure to reject the "null" model indicates a good model fit. The 
relative chi-square is non-significant (CMINIDF= l.97, p = 0.12) indicating a good fit for 
the data. The Normed Fit Index (NFl) indicates the proportion in the improvement of the 
overall fit of the model being tested as compared to the null or independent model. In 
this case, significant relationships are not assumed among variables in the null model and 
thus a good model fit is detected when the researcher' s model is statistically different 
from the null. It is recommended that the NFl have a value greater than 0.9 (Bentler, 
1990). The model produced a NFl = 0.98 which is consistent with a good model fit for 
the data. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) serves a similar function and is used to further 
interpret the goodness of fit for the tested model (Byrne, 2001). For the CUlTent model, 
CFI = 0.99 suggesting that it is a good fit for the data. The Root Mean Square ElTor of 
Approximation (RMSEA) is used to estimate lack of fit compared to the saturated model 
and should have a value less than 0.1 (Loehlin, 2004). 
Figure 3: Final Tested Path Model 
Monitoring 
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Adelson (2012) noted "whereas (other fit indexes) may be considered a goodness-of-fit 
indexes, RMSEA may be considered a badness-of-fit index with greater values indicating 
a worse fit" (p. 52). RMSEA = 0.08 indicating that the model is not a bad fit for the 
data. 
Comparison Models 
Social anxiety and depression are highly comorbid (e.g. , Kashdan & Roberts, 2011). 
Moreover, perseverative thought processes are common in individuals with depression 
(e.g., Hanington & Blankenship, 2002). In particular, post-event rumination has been 
linked to the maintenance of depressive symptoms (e.g. , Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Given 
these factors , a comparison model was constructed to ascertain whether the relationships 
among the tested variables and the significance of the model overall could be explained 
by phenomena associated with depression (See Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Path Model with Depression included as a Variable 
Beliefs 757 
Monitoring 
Control 
D epression 
With path analysis, it is possible to evaluate the comparative fit of different models to the 
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data by comparing their relative chi-square statistics. When including depression as a 
variable in the model, the model was a good fit for the data overall. However, including 
depression in the model did not improve the "goodness" of the overall model fit. That is, 
a comparison of relative chi-square statistics between the two models revealed a non-
significant statistical difference (X2 (1) = 0.99, p = 0.32). As an exploratory enterprise, 
the social anxiety variable was replaced with depression as the dependent variable to 
determine whether depression might provide for a better model fit. This model was a 
poor fit for the data (CMIN/DF=5.91 , p<O.OOI ; NFl = 0.76; CFI = 0.75; RMSEA = 0.18). 
In both cases, results suggest that the impact of depressive symptoms is not significant 
for the model. Therefore, and in the interest of model parsimony, depression was not 
included in the final model. 
Social anxiety is more prevalent in women, than in men (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, 
McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996). Sex differences have also been detected in terms of 
Figure 5: Path Model with Sex Included as a Variable 
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perseverative thought with women reporting experiencing more worry and rumination 
than men report (e.g., Yoder & Lawrence, 2011). In light of these findings and in 
response to the disproportionate number of female participants in the current study, a 
comparison model was run that included sex as a variable (See Figure 5). This 
comparison model was a good fit for the data; however, it did not improve the fit of the 
model overall. A comparison of the two models produced a non-significant statistical 
difference (X2 (1) = 0.19, P = 0.66). Moreover, sex was not a component ofa statistically 
significant pathway within the model. Therefore, sex was not included in the final 
model. 
Table 4: Fit Indexes Jar Path Models 
(MIN/DF (p) NFl (FI RMSEA 
Final Model 1.97 (0.12) 0.98 0.99 0.08 
Model Including 1.65 (0.16) 0.92 0.96 0.07 
Depression 
Model Including 1.44 (0.22) 0.93 0.97 0.06 
Sex 
Direct effects 
Given the strength of the path model, it is possible to examine relationships 
between variables in the model. That is, it is important to ascertain whether established 
relationships (i .e., correlations) between variables of interest hold within the context of 
the path model. The relationship between metacognitive beliefs and anticipatory 
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processing was significant, r=6.64, p <.001. The relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and post-event processing was significant, r=4.71, p<.OO1. The relationship 
between metacognitive monitoring and anticipatory processing was significant, r=12.63, 
p=0.04. Contrary to results from preliminary analyses, the relationship between 
Table 5: Direct Relationships Between Variables in the Final Path Model 
Variable 
Metacognitive Beliefs 
Anticipatory Processing 
Post-Event Processing 
Metacognitive Monitoring 
Anticipatory Processing 
Post-Event Processing 
Metacognitive Control 
Anticipatory Processing 
Post-Event Processing 
Anticipatory Processing 
Social Anxiety 
Post-Event Processing 
Social Anxiety 
r 
6.64 
4.71 
12.63 
6.01 
-1.14 
-0.72 
0.03 
-0.004 
p 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.04 
0.13 
0.70 
0.70 
<0.001 
0.74 
metacognitive monitoring and post-event processing was non-significant, r=6.01, p=0.13 
as was the relationship between metacognitive control and anticipatory processing, r=-
1.14, p=0.70. Similarly, the relationship between metacognitive control and post-event 
processing was non-significant, r=-O.72, p=0.70 which contrasts with preliminary 
analyses. The relationship between anticipatory processing and social anxiety was 
significant, r=0.026, p<.OO1. Although there was a correlation between post-event 
processing and social anxiety in preliminary analyses, this relationship was non-
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significant, r=-0.004, p = 0.74 in the path model. Given the substantial correlation 
between anticipatory processing and post-event processing, the error terms of these two 
variables were covaried in the model and the relationship was significant (p<.OOl). 
Indirect Effects 
As stated, the influence of metacognitive processes on social anxiety within the 
hypothesized model were expected to be indirect. That is, metacognitive processes were 
hypothesized to affect levels of social anxiety by way of perseverative thought constructs 
(i.e., AP and PEP). Hypothesized indirect effects were measured by the Sobel Test 
Table 6: Indirect Relationships in the Path Model 
Indirect Relationship Sobel's Statistic p 
Metacognitive Beliefs ~ AP ~ Social Anxiety 3.90 <0.001 
Metacognitive Beliefs ~ PEP ~ Social Anxiety 0.31 0.76 
Metacognitive Monitoring ~ AP ~ Social Anxiety 1.54 0.12 
Metacognitive Monitoring ~ PEP ~ Social Anxiety -0.03 0.77 
Metacognitive Control ~ AP ~ Social Anxiety -0.55 0.58 
Metacognitive Control ~ PEP ~ Social Anxiety 0.27 0.79 
(Sobel, 1986) which is a method for detecting whether the effect of an independent 
variable on a dependent variable via a mediator variable is significant. This method 
indicated that the indirect path between metacognitive beliefs and social anxiety via the 
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intermediate variable of anticipatory processing was significant: Sobel Test statistic = 
3.90, p<O.OOl. Contrary to expectations, the indirect path between metacognitive beliefs 
and social anxiety via post event processing was non-significant: Sobel test statistic = -
0.31, P =0.76. The indirect path between metacognitive monitoring and social anxiety 
through the intermediate variable of anticipatory processing was non-significant: Sobel 
test statistic = 1.54, P = 0.12. The indirect path between metacognitive monitoring and 
social anxiety through the intermediate variable of post-event processing was non-
significant: Sobel Test statistic = -0.03, P = .77. The indirect path between metacognitive 
control and social anxiety via the intermediate variable of anticipatory processing was 
non-significant: sobel's test statistic = -0.55, P = 0.58. The indirect path metween 
metacognitive control and social anxiety via the intermediate variable of post-event 
processing was non-significant: Sobel Test statistic = 0.27, P = 0.79. 
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DISCUSSION 
Social anxiety is prevalent and debilitating (Kessler, et aI., 2005; Rosenberg, 
Ledley, & Heimberg, 2010). Contemporary models emphasize unique cognitive 
phenomena associated with social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hinrichsen & Clark, 
2003; Hudson & Rapee, 2000; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). These models tend to be 
concerned with how the socially anxious individual thinks and feels when they are 
immersed in a social context. However recent research has begun to investigate the 
experience of the socially anxious individual before and after the social event. 
Researchers have posited that socially anxious individuals preemptively ponder the social 
experience, anticipating social failure. Vassilopolous (2004) linked what he termed 
Anticipatory Processing, empirically, to symptoms of social anxiety. Rachman (2000) 
argued that, following the social event, the socially anxious individual engages in Post-
Event Processing wherein the social experience is reviewed such that perceived social 
failures are emphasized. In turn, symptoms of social anxiety are maintained. These 
thought processes are perseverative in quality insofar as they are self-focused, repetitive, 
and associated with the prolonging of psychological distress. Metacognitive processes 
have been linked to the maintenance of perseverative thought in other forms of 
psychopathology (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001, 2003; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Wells, 
1995,2000,2005,2007; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998a). The current study was designed 
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to investigate whether metacognitive processes are associated with social anxiety 
symptoms via perseverative thought processes, namely AP and PEP. 
Aim 1: Replicating previously established direct relationships 
Aim 1 of the current study was to replicate previously established direct 
relationships in order to provide an adequate statistical foundation for more complex 
analyses. As expected, correlational analyses run for the present study yielded results 
that are consistent with previous research (Amir, et aI., 2003; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 
1997; Dannahy & Stopa, 2007; Fisher & Wells, 2009; McEvoy, et aI., 2009; Rachman, et 
aI., 2000; Vassilopoulos, 2004). Each tested relationship was statistically significant, 
except for the relationship between metacognitive monitoring and social anxiety 
symptoms. Although this finding was unexpected, research is limited in this area as there 
are only two known studies that have examined this potential link (Dannahy & Stopa, 
2007; McEvoy, et aI., 2009) and metacognitive monitoring was not a primary focus of 
either study. In addition, findings are mixed regarding the relationship between 
metacognitive monitoring and symptoms of psychopathology. For example, research 
conducted by Irak and colleagues (2008) revealed a relationship between OCD symptoms 
and increased metacognitive monitoring. In contrast, other researchers have linked 
depression to a deficit of metacognitive monitoring (Sheppard & Teasdale, 2000). 
Results of this study showed that depressed individuals did not discriminate between 
attitudinal statements presented to them that were either congruent with, or in opposition 
to, schemas associated with depression. The researchers extrapolated that this was due to 
an impairment of metacognitive monitoring, i.e., the depressed individuals failed to 
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observe their own cognitive schemas when presented with comparative information. 
Regardless, although not correlated with symptoms of social anxiety, metacognitive 
monitoring was related to both perseverative constructs, and thus was retained for the 
path model. 
Aim 2: Evaluating the statistical cogency of the hypothesized model and pathways 
Model Fit 
These direct relationships have largely been established in previous studies (e.g., 
Dannahy & Stopa, 2007; Rachman, et aI., 2000; Vassilopoulos, 2004). Aim 2 of the 
present study was to examine the associations among variables within a unitary model. 
Of importance is whether these previously established relationships hold within the 
context of a larger relational context. Advances in computation software have allowed 
for a more complex, inclusive, and broader view of relationships among variables. In the 
present study, path analysis revealed that the hypothesized model was a good fit for the 
data. The model was strong, overall, as measured by each of the reported fit indexes. 
Moreover, multiple comparison models were run to ascertain the potential advantage of 
including additional variables in the path model. Because of the high proportion of 
female participants in this study, it was necessary to explore the int1uence sex might have 
on the model. Consistent with preliminary analyses that showed no relationship between 
sex and any of the model variables, including sex as a variable in the path model was of 
no statistical benefit. In addition, given the high rate of comorbidity between social 
anxiety and depression, a comparison model was run with depression as a predictor 
variable. Inclusion of this variable provided no advantage and was thus excluded from 
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the final model. An exploratory model was run to determine whether the integrity of the 
model would hold with depression as the dependent variable. This model was a poor fit 
for the data and was therefore discarded. Taken together these results suggest that the 
model provides a statistically adequate context for describing the associations among 
variables within it. It was possible, then, to interpret the pathways contained in the path 
model. 
Direct Relationships 
An examination of direct relationships in the model revealed that a number of 
previously established relationships were maintained when evaluated within the path 
model. The hypothesis that anticipatory processing and symptoms of social anxiety 
would be significantly related was supported. These results mirror findings from work 
conducted by Vassilopolous (2004) which showed that social anxiety is associated with 
recurrent, intrusive, and interfering anticipatory worry about the social event. Results of 
the present study provided support for the link between metacognitive beliefs and AP. 
Although there is a relative dearth of literature in this area, these findings provide 
affirmation of preliminary results suggesting that beliefs about anticipatory worry (related 
to the social event) aid in the maintenance of this maladaptive thought process. For 
example, the belief that worry is preparatory may help to maintain the process of AP 
prior to a feared social event for the socially anxious individual. Findings of the present 
study also linked metacognitive beliefs to PEP. This is in line with research conducted 
by McEvoy and colleagues (2009) that found an association between negative 
metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and harm, and the persistence of PEP. 
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Previous research has suggested that these types of beliefs tend to stimulate negative 
affect which, in tum, maintains the ruminative thought process (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2001). The relationship between metacognitive monitoring and AP was significant, 
which is consistent with study hypotheses. Although there is preliminary research 
suggesting a link between metacognitive monitoring and social anxiety symptoms 
generally, the link between metacognitive monitoring and AP is novel. This finding 
suggests that individuals who engage in AP, tend to be hyperaware of their thoughts 
which is be problematic as these perseverative thought processes are associated with 
negative affect (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). 
Although some of the direct relationships were maintained, others did not hold 
within the context of the path model. While PEP was correlated with social anxiety 
symptoms in preliminary analyses, this association was non-significant in path analysis. 
This finding stands in contrast with a body of research that suggests PEP is a construct 
that aids in the maintenance of social anxiety (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Dannahy & Stopa, 
2007; Fehm, et aI., 2008; Fehm, et aI., 2007; Field, Psychol, & Morgan, 2004; Kashdan & 
Roberts, 2007; Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett, 2005; McEvoy, et aI., 2009; Rachman, 
et aI., 2000). However, the present study is the first known attempt to observe the 
relationship between PEP and social anxiety in a broader relational context. It is possible 
that the relationship between social anxiety and PEP was mitigated by the significant 
association between AP and social anxiety symptoms. As noted, these constructs are 
highly related such that researchers have speculated about conceptual overlap 
(Vassilopoulos, 2004). However, to account for this, AP and PEP were covaried in the 
path model. Despite this technique, the relationship between PEP and social anxiety was 
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not significant. It may be that AP is more meaningfully related to social anxiety insofar 
as worrying about the social situation leading up to it exacerbates symptoms more so than 
does reflecting on the event once it has already occurred. The experience of anxiety 
tends to reflect excessive concern about an uncertain, often amorphous threat. By 
implication, this suggests that the identified "threat" has not occurred. For example, 
worry in GAD is often characterized by "what if' statements regarding future-oriented 
concerns (Craighead, Miklowitz, & Craighead, 2008). This so-called "fortune telling" 
tends to stimulate anxiety symptoms proximally, while also aiding in the maintenance of 
an anxious disposition in the long-term. Results from the current study comport with 
these concepts insofar as socially-based worry (i.e., anticipatory processing) about future 
social events appears to disproportionately influence social anxiety symptoms as 
compared to post-event processing. In contrast with preliminary correlation analyses, 
metacognitive monitoring was not significantly related to PEP in the path model. 
Metacognitive monitoring has been linked to social anxiety symptoms generally; 
however, to date no empirical relationship has been established between metacognitive 
monitoring and PEP per se. It is possible that the relationship between metacognitive 
monitoring and social anxiety is not influenced by PEP. Metacognitive (attentional) 
control was not significantly related to AP or PEP in the path model. This is surprising 
given previous research conducted by Amir and colleagues (2003) as well as Buckner 
and colleagues (2010) suggesting that socially anxious individuals experience difficulty 
disengaging attention from social threat. This may be explained, in part, by 
metacognitive beliefs. That is, the metacognitive beliefs variable included beliefs about 
the uncontrollability of perseverative thought. It is possible that individuals might not 
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exercise much control over perseverative thought processes if they believe their thoughts 
are uncontrollable. Of note, the covarying relationship between metacognitive beliefs 
and metacognitive control is significant (p=0.02). 
Indirect Relationships 
Regarding indirect relationships, results supported a significant pathway from 
metacognitive beliefs to social anxiety symptoms by way of anticipatory processing 
which is consistent with study hypotheses. This finding is highly consistent with Wells' 
theory of psychological disorder which posits that emotional distress is maintained by a 
maladaptive coping process in which individuals engage in perseverative thought. This 
maladaptive coping process is perpetuated by beliefs about the functionality of 
perseverative thought. In turn, psychological distress is maintained and this cyclical 
process continues (Wells, 2000). In this case, beliefs (positive and negative) about the 
utility of perseverative thought may aid in the maintenance of anticipatory processing. 
For example, the socially anxious individual may believe that engaging in worry prior to 
the social experience may allow her to anticipate potential social embarrassment and, 
thus, be prepared for this possibility. This is similar to Davey and colleagues (1996) 
findings that worry associated with GAD is perceived by the worrier as preparatory or as 
a problem solving strategy. However, previous research suggests that this type of 
perseverative thought initiates and/or exacerbates the experience of anxiety (Borkovec, 
1994; Davey, et a!., 1996; de long-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Wells, 2005). It 
reasons, then, that the socially anxious individual engages in AP so as to anticipate and 
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prepare for potential social embarrassment; however, this strategy is self-defeating as it 
serves to prolong the distressing social anxiety symptoms. 
Contrary to expectations, the indirect relationship between metacognitive beliefs 
and social anxiety via PEP was not significant. Although this was an unexpected result, 
it is consistent with the idea that anticipatory processing is a more meaningful construct 
as it relates to social anxiety symptoms. As mentioned, the previously established direct 
relationship between PEP and social anxiety symptoms did not hold in the current model. 
To date, the current study is the first to evaluate the relative influence of AP and PEP 
within a larger statistical model. It may be that PEP is simply not a meaningful construct 
as it relates to social anxiety symptoms. This notion is in line with the large body of 
research linking anticipatory worry, rather than post-hoc rumination, to pathological 
anxiety (e.g., Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, et aI., 1983; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; 
Covin, Ouimet, Seeds, & Dozois, 2008; Davey, et aI., 1996; Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, 
& Freeston, 1998; Francis & Dugas, 2004; Freeston, et aI., 1994; Hong, 2007; Wells, 
1995). It is also possible that post-hoc rumination in social anxiety tends to carryover 
into a worry process. That is, PEP information may be used by the socially anxious 
individual as worry material for future social concerns. In the face of a potentially 
distressing social situation, the socially anxious individual draws from previous "failures" 
and uses this information as a part of the foundation for anticipatory processing. 
The indirect relationship between metacognitive monitoring and social anxiety 
through the intermediate variable of AP was not significant. The pathway between 
metacognitive monitoring and social anxiety via PEP was also non-significant. These 
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results were somewhat surprising as previous research has linked dysfunctional 
metacognitive monitoring to psychopathology (Sheppard & Teasdale, 2000; Spada, et aI., 
2008). Moreover, some findings have delineated a relationship between metacognitive 
monitoring social anxiety generally (McEvoy, et ai., 2009). However, findings are 
limited in this regard as there are few studies addressing this concept specifically. 
Moreover, the findings linking metacognitive monitoring to psychopathology generally 
are mixed in terms of relationship directionality (i.e., is there more or less metacognitive 
monitoring in psychopathology). In addition, in these studies metacognitive monitoring 
was evaluated independently, and was not observed in relation to other metacognitive 
constructs. Therefore, the contribution of metacognitive monitoring to social anxiety 
symptoms may be accounted for by the impact of other, more meaningful metacognitive 
constructs. 
The indirect pathways that included metacognitive control were non-significant. 
That is, contrary to expectations, the indirect relationships between metacognitive control 
and social anxiety symptoms via AP and PEP were not statistically meaningful. This 
finding may be an artifact of measurement techniques insofar as actual control was not 
assessed. Rather, an individual's perception of control was observed via self-report. It 
may be that there is a distinction between a person's perceived control and the 
metacognitive control that he or she actually exerts regarding perseverative thought 
processes. In addition, the Attentional Control Scale does not focus on one's ability to 
attend (or not attend) to one's own cognitions. Rather, it contains items that are 
indirectly, but not specifically, related to an individual's capacity in this regard. It is 
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possible that this instrument did not capture the relationship between social anxiety and 
the perceived ability to focus attention on, or away from, internal cognitive information. 
Treatment Implications 
Results of the present study underscore the significance of metacognitive 
processes as they relate to the maintenance of perseverative thought and, in turn, social 
anxiety. These are useful findings as they advance our conceptual understanding of 
constructs that perpetuate the social anxiety experience. In addition to these empirical 
implications, these findings are significant in terms of treatment for symptoms of social 
anxiety. Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) posits that it is not events themselves that 
produce distress; rather it is the way we perceive these events that affects our experience 
(Heimberg, 2005). Cognitive restructuring involves the hypothesis testing of our 
thoughts and beliefs, evaluating the extent to which they are rational or irrational. 
Irrational thoughts and beliefs are challenged so as to engender a new and less distressing 
relationship with the world. This process typically involves challenging mental 
constructs about our experience. Rosenberg and colleagues (2010) suggest that, in the 
case of social anxiety, dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., "I will get too anxious to finish the 
speech") are to be tested and challenged with more adaptive beliefs (e.g., "I can continue 
the speech even if I am anxious"). That is, the focus of intervention is the belief about 
the external situation. Results of the present study suggest; however, that beliefs about 
internal processes may be just as viable an intervention target. Just as maladaptive 
beliefs about the social situation itself perpetuate social anxiety, dysfunctional beliefs 
about perseverative thought (e.g., "AP helps me anticipate and prepare for social failure") 
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may sustain symptoms of social anxiety by perpetuating a problematic thought process. 
Consistent with the CBT model, evaluating the veracity of these beliefs about 
perseverative thought may provide an avenue for disrupting this maladaptive thought 
process. 
In fact, therapeutic techniques described by Fisher and Wells (2009) suggest that 
it is possible to decrease distress by targeting the process of perseverative thought 
specifically. In what they call Metacognitive Therapy (MCT) Fisher and Wells delineate 
their theory that psychological distress is centered on the relationship we maintain with 
our thought processes. According to this model, it is the perseverative quality of thought 
that is problematic, more so than the content. Despite their arguments to the contrary, 
the strategies they offer are consistent with a CBT framework. That is, the mechanism of 
change is an alteration of maladaptive beliefs, albeit beliefs about the perseverative 
thought process. Although the authors do not reference social anxiety specifically, they 
discuss the process of worry in general as a target for intervention. This method, it 
seems, could be naturally applied to the process of AP in social anxiety. 
In addition, the results of the present study suggest that the socially anxious 
individual maintains a problematic relationship with her cognitive processes. AP is 
maintained, in part, due to metacognitive beliefs that sustain it. This constitutes, in 
effect, a unique way that the socially anxious person relates to the very thing that 
maintains her anxiety. The beliefs that she holds appear to render her "stuck" in the 
maladaptive process of AP. Mindfulness-based psychotherapy approaches involve, 
among other things, the way we relate to our internal experiences including cognition. 
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Whereas the psychologically distressed person tends to become entangled with her 
cognitive processes, mindfulness suggests that a gentle "detachment" from these 
processes provides psychological distance and promotes a shift in perspective about their 
nature and impact (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). This detachment 
process involves the manner by which our attention is deployed and held, particularly as 
this relates to internal experiences. This has obvious applications to the process of AP in 
social anxiety. That is, interventions designed to redefine the relationship held by the 
socially anxious individual with AP may, ultimately, lessen her distress. At least one 
study has provided preliminary support for this. Schmidt and colleagues (2009) detected 
a reduction in social anxiety symptoms following an attention training intervention. 
Though not a mindfulness-based intervention per se, this method involved a shaping of 
attentional processes which is also emphasized in mindfulness-based approaches. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the findings of this study are novel and provide a contribution to the 
literature regarding the cognitive and metacognitive architecture of social anxiety, there 
are limitations that are important to consider when interpreting these findings. Data were 
gathered via self-report instruments. Although the psychometrics of each of these 
instruments are quite good, this method of data collection presents some interpretive 
challenges. Self-report instruments, by definition, measure the individual's impression of 
a given psychological construct. This is not a direct measurement approach and thus it is 
possible that additional variance (and error) is introduced into the measurement process. 
However, it can be argued that an individual's impression of a psychological construct 
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may be what we are interested in anyway. For example, when considering a diagnosis of 
Social Anxiety Disorder, we are interested in the level of distress and impairment an 
individual is reporting based on her subjective experience of symptoms. Thus it is not the 
social anxiety symptom that constitutes pathology per se; rather it is the individual's 
perception of, or distress regarding that symptom with which we are concerned. 
Nevertheless, future research in this area should consider using diagnostic interviews to 
obtain more robust information regarding social anxiety pathology. In addition, there are 
no known techniques for directly measuring the cognitive and metacognitive variables 
included in this study. However, there have been some interesting methods used to 
observe perseverative thought, including Stroop techniques (e.g., Sheppard & Teasdale, 
2000) and fMRI technology (e.g., P. Goldin, et aI., 2009) that have advanced our 
understanding of these processes. Although they do not provide a direct measurement of 
perseverative thought and maintain interpretive limitations as well, these methods are 
intriguing and may provide for a more detailed depiction of perseverative thought in 
social anxiety. It is likely a worthwhile endeavor to incorporate such experimental 
techniques into research in this area. 
The composition of this sample is a limitation of the current study. The sample 
was recruited from the student body of a large university. Although the benefits of this 
are multiple (e.g., providing for a large enough sample size), there are limitations to using 
a college sample. The sample is not a clinical sample. Therefore, it is inappropriate to 
describe the findings as indicative of psychpatholgical phenomena per se. Rather, these 
findings reflect relationships among variables as they occur within the context of a 
college population. In addition, the age range of the current sample is restricted to 
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between 18 and 30, with most of the participants falling between the ages of 18 and 22. 
It is plausible that the results of this study will not generalize to other age ranges. In 
addition, the sample was relatively homogonous in terms of ethnicity. That is, the sample 
was predominantly European American (68%). Although the demographic composition 
of the sample mimics the demographics of the U.S., further ethnic diversity would likely 
provide for a more complete depiction of phenomena included in the current study. 
In addition, the sample was predominantly female. In order to account for this, a 
comparison model was run but did not provide any statistical advantage relative to the 
primary model. Despite this, the disproportionate number of female participants is not 
representative of the population at large. Of note, some research suggests that social 
anxiety symptomotology tends to be more prevalent in women than men (Kessler, et aI., 
2005). Other researchers posit that this sex distinction can be explained by differences 
between men and women in the respective rates of reported psychiatric symptoms (e.g., 
Egloff & Schmukle, 2004). In either case, there is an apparent difference across sexes in 
terms of symptom report and, by extension, what is available to measurement. Given this 
issue, it is possible that the findings of this study were unduly influenced by the sex 
imbalance in the sample. Future research should attempt to utilize a sample with a more 
balanced sex distribution. 
The present study was neither sequential nor longitudinal and thus it is not 
possible to comment empirically on temporal relationships among these variables. These 
temporal relationships are potentially important in terms of early intervention and, 
ideally, preventive measures. It is possible that people develop a metacognitive style 
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based, in part, on early learning experiences. For example, metacognitive learning 
processes are emphasized in some educational formats. For example, there are programs 
that teach metacognitive strategies that emphasize, among other things, learning how to 
select effective problem-solving strategies by learning to discern which mental process 
would be most helpful for a given problem (e.g., Kramarski, 2004). The development of 
(or lack thereof) of such strategies may lay the groundwork for the presence or absence of 
maladaptive perseverative thought and, ultimately, social anxiety symptoms. If so, 
emphasizing metacognitive development in an individual's early experience may serve as 
a protective factor against the emergence of psychological distress. Alternatively, it may 
be that the development of social anxiety precedes that of metacognitive beliefs about 
perseverative thought. It seems reasonable to suspect that when social anxiety symptoms 
emerge, a person tends to engage in anticipatory worry about the distressing social event. 
In turn, this person might develop a post hoc rationale for why she engages in this 
process. In any case, it is critical that the sequential and longitudinal characteristics of 
these processes be delineated. 
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Appendix A: Anticipatory Processing Questionnaire 
Anticipatory Processing Questionnaire (APQ) 
Developed by Stephanos Vassilopoulos 
According to recent research findings, most people experience anxiety before 
entering a social event-activity (such as a party, dating, acquaintance with unknown 
people). Did you happen to experience anxiety before a social event during the past few 
months? If yes, then please rate your responses next to each question below using the 
following scale: 
0------1 0------20------30------40------50------60------70------80------90------100 
"Not at all" 
"Extremely" 
1) How much anxiety did you believe you experienced? __ 
2) Did you find yourself thinking about the event a lot? __ 
3) Did the thoughts and ideas about the event keep coming into your head even when 
you did not wish to think about it again? __ 
4) Did you find the thoughts ever interfering with your concentration? 
5) How negative were your thoughts/ideas about the event? __ 
6) Did you find it difficult to forget about the event? __ 
7) Did you try to stop thinking about the event? __ 
8) If you did think about the event, over and over again, did you find your anxiety 
increasing more and more? __ 
9) If you did think about the event, over and over again, did you find your anxiety 
decreasing more and more? __ 
10) Did you try to form some predictions and/or estimates about the event (the course 
and outcome of the event, consequences, etc.)? __ 
11) How negative were these predictions/estimates? __ 
12) Did you try to predict in every detail your behavior and other people's reactions, 
as if you were watching a movie in which you were the protagonist (main 
character) ? 
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13) How much did you try to think of ways that you might deal withlavoid particular 
problems during the social interaction? __ 
14) Did you recall any past similar social situations (e.g. prior parties or dates)? 
15) How negative were these recollections? __ 
16) How positive were these recollections? __ 
17) Did you, finally, avoid the social event completely? **For this question, circle yes 
or no below** 
Yes/No 
18) If no, did you ever wish that you could avoid the event? 
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Appendix B: Attentional Control Scale 
Attentional Control Scale (ACQ) 
Developed by Douglas Derryberry and Marjorie A. Reed 
Below is a list of statements about attention that mayor may not apply to you. 
Based upon your own personal experiences, please indicate how frequently each 
statement applies to you. Please rate each statement using the following scale: 
1 - almost never; 2 - sometimes; 3 -often; 4 - always 
1) It's very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when there are noises 
around. 
2) When I need to concentrate and solve a problem, I have trouble focusing my 
attention. 
3) When I am working hard on something, I still get distracted by events around me. 
4) My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me. 
5) When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that I become unaware of what's 
going on in the room around me. 
6) When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted ifthere are people talking 
in the same room. 
7) When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out 
distracting thoughts. 
8) I have a hard time concentrating when I'm excited about something. 
9) When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst. 
10) I can quickly switch from one task to another. 
11) It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task. 
12) It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between the listening and writing 
required when taking notes during lectures. 
13) I can become interested in a new topic very quickly when I need to. 
14) It is easy for me to read or write while I'm also talking on the phone. 
15) I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once. 
16) I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly. 
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17) After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily shift my attention back to what I 
was doing before. 
18) When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy for me to shift my attention 
away from it. 
19) It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks. 
20) It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about something and look at it 
from another point of view. 
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Appendix C: Beck Depression Inventory-II 
BDI-II 
Developed by Beck, A.T., Steer ,R.A., Ball, R., & Ranieri, W. 
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each 
group of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that 
best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, including 
today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in 
the group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure 
that you do not choose more than one statement for any group, including Item 16 
(Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite). 
1. Sadness 
o I do not feel sad 
1 I feel sad much of the time 
2 I am sad all the time 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it 
2. Pessimism 
o I am not discouraged about my future 
1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me. 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
3. Past Failure 
o I do not feel like a failure 
1 I have failed more than I should have. 
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
4. Loss of Pleasure 
o I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to. 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
5. Guilty Feelings 
o I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
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6. Punishment Feelings 
o I don't feel I am being punished. 
I I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
7 . Self-Dislike 
o I feel the same about myself as ever. 
I I have lost confidence in myself. 
2 I am disappointed in myself. 
3 I dislike myself. 
8. Self-Criticalness 
o I don't criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
I I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
o I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
I I have thoughts of killing myself but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
10. Crying 
o I don't cry any more than I used to. 
I I cry more than I used to. 
2 I cry over every little thing. 
3 I feel like crying but I can't. 
11. Agitation 
o I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
I I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
2 I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay still. 
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something. 
12. Loss of Interest 
o I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
I I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
3 It's hard to get interested in anything. 
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13. Indecisiveness 
o I make decisions about as well as ever. 
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
2 I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
3 I have trouble making any decisions. 
14. Worthlessness 
o I do not feel I am worthless. 
1 I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to. 
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
3 I feel utterly worthless. 
15. Loss of Energy 
o I have as much energy as ever. 
I I have less energy than I used to have. 
2 I don't have enough energy to do very much. 
3 I don't have enough energy to do anything. 
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
o I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
1 a. I sleep somewhat more than usual. 
1 b. I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
2a. I sleep a lot more than usual. 
2b. I sleep a lot less than usual. 
3a. I sleep most of the day. 
3b. I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back to sleep. 
17. Irritability 
o I am no more irritable than usual. 
1 I am more irritable than usual. 
2 I am much more irritable than usual. 
3 I am irritable all the time. 
18. Changes in Appetite 
o I have not experienced any change in my appetite. 
1 a. My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
1 b. My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. 
2a. My appetite is much less than before. 
2b. My appetite is much greater than usual. 
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3a. I have no appetite at all. 
3b. I crave food all the time. 
19. Concentration Difficulty 
o I can concentrate as well as ever. 
1 I can't concentrate as well as usual. 
2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
3 I find I can't concentrate on anything. 
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
o I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
21. Loss oflnterest in Sex 
o I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interest in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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Appendix D: Metacognitions Questionnaire 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (Roy-Byrne et al.) 
Developed by Cartwright-Hatton, S., & Wells, A. 
This questionnaire is concerned with beliefs people have about their thinking. Listed below are a number 
of beliefs that people have expressed. Please read each item and say how much you generally agree with it 
by circling the appropriate number. Please respond to all the items. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Agree 
Do not Agree Agree very 
agree slightly moderately much 
I. Worry helps me to avoid problems in the future. I 2 3 4 
2. My worrying is dangerous for me 1 2 3 4 
3. I have difficulty knowing if I have actually done something, or just I 2 3 4 
imagined it. 
4. I think a lot about my thoughts. 2 3 4 
5. I could make myself sick with worrying. 2 3 4 
6. I am aware of the way my mind works when I am thinking through 2 3 4 
a problem. 
7. IfI did not control a worrying thought, and then it happened, it 2 3 4 
would be my fault. 
8. If I let my worrying thoughts get out of control, they will end up 2 3 4 
controlling me. 
9. I need to worry in order to remain organized. 2 3 4 
10. I have little confidence in my memory for words and names. 2 
,., 
4 .J 
II. My worrying thoughts persist, no matter how I try to stop them. 2 
,., 
4 .J 
12. Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my mind. 2 
,., 
4 .J 
13. I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts. 2 3 4 
14.1 monitor my thoughts. 2 3 4 
15. I should be in control of my thoughts all of the time. 2 3 4 
16. My memory can mislead me at times. 2 3 4 
17. I could be punished for not having celiain thoughts. 2 3 4 
18. My worrying could make me go mad. 2 3 4 
19. If 1 do not stop my worrying thoughts, they could come true. 2 3 4 
20.1 rarely question my thoughts. 2 
,., 
4 .J 
21. Worrying puts my body under a lot of stress. 2 3 4 
22. Worrying helps me to avoid disastrous situations. 2 3 4 
23. I am constantly aware of my thinking. 2 3 4 
24.1 have a poor memory. 2 3 4 
25.1 pay close attention to the way my mind works. 2 3 4 
26. People who do not worry have no depth. 2 3 4 
27. Worrying helps me cope. 2 3 4 
28. I imagine having not done things and then doubt my memory for 2 3 4 
doing them. 
29. Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness. 2 3 4 
30. If I did not worry, I would make more mistakes. 2 3 4 
31.1 find it difficult to control my thoughts. 2 3 4 
32. Worrying is a sign ofa good person. 2 3 4 
33. Worrying thoughts enter my head against my will. 2 
,., 
4 .J 
34. IfI could not control my thoughts I would go crazy. 2 3 4 
35. I will lose out in life ifI do not worry. 2 3 4 
36. When I start worrying, I cannot stop. 2 3 4 
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37. Some thoughts will always need to be controlled. 2 3 4 
38.1 need to worry in order to get things done. 2 3 4 
39.1 will be punished for not controlling certain thoughts. 2 3 4 
40. My thoughts interfere with my concentration. 2 3 4 
41 . It is alright to let my thoughts roam free. 2 3 4 
42. I worry about my thoughts. 2 3 4 
43. I am easily distracted. 2 3 4 
44. My worrying thoughts are not productive. 2 3 4 
45. Worry can stop me from seeing a situation clearly. 2 3 4 
46. Worrying helps me to solve problems. 2 
.., 
4 -' 
47. I have little confidence in my memory for places. 2 
.., 
4 -' 
48. My won-ying thoughts are uncontrollable. 2 
.., 
4 -' 
49. It is bad to think certain thoughts. 2 3 4 
50. If I do not control my thoughts, I may end up embarrassing myself. 2 3 4 
51. I do not trust my memory. 2 3 4 
52. I do my clearest thinking when I am worrying. 2 3 4 
53. My won-ying thoughts appear automatically. 2 3 4 
54. I would be selfish if I never worried. 2 3 4 
55.lfI could not control my thoughts, I would not be able to function. 2 3 4 
56. I need to worry, in order to work well. 2 3 4 
57. I have little confidence in my memory for actions. 2 3 4 
58.1 have difficulty keeping my mind focused on one thing for 2 3 4 
a long time. 
59. If a bad thing happens which I have not worried about I feel 2 3 4 
responsible. 
60. It would not be normal if I did not WOlTy. I 2 
.., 
4 -' 
61. I constantly examine my thoughts. I 2 3 4 
62. If I stopped worrying, I would become glib, arrogant, and offensive. I 2 3 4 
63. Worrying helps me plan the future more effectively. 2 3 4 
64. I would be a stronger person if I could worry less. 2 3 4 
65. I would be stupid and complacent not to worry. 2 3 4 
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Appendix E: Post-Event Processing Questionnaire 
Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (PEPQ) 
Developed by S. Rachman, 1. Gruter-Andrew, and R. Shafran 
According to research, many people experience anxiety in social situations. During the past few 
months, have you experienced anxiety/nervousness in a social situation (such as at a party, public speaking, 
dating, etc.)? If yes, than please answer the questions below. Please rate your responses next to each 
question below using the following scale: 
0------10------20------30------40------50------60------7 0------80------90------100 
"Not at all" 
"Extremely" 
1) How much anxiety did you experience? __ 
2) After the event was over, did you find yourself thinking about it a lot7 
3) Did your memories and thoughts about the event keep coming into your head even when you did 
not wish to think about it again? __ 
4) Did the thoughts about the event ever interfere with your concentration? __ 
5) Were the thoughts/memories about the event ever welcome to you? 
6) Did you find it difficult to forget about the event? __ 
7) Did you try to resist thinking about the event? __ 
8) If you did think about the event, over and over again, did your feelings about the event get worse 
and worse? 
9) If you did think about the event, over and over again, did your feelings about the event get better 
and better? 
10) If you thought about the event, did you see it from your point of view, or how other people would 
view it? 
**For this question circle above, either "from your point of view" or "how other people would 
view it"** 
II) Did you ever wonder about whether you could have avoided or prevented your behavior/feelings 
during the event? __ 
12) Did you ever wish that you could turn the clock back and re-do it D do it again, but do it better? 
13) As a result of the event, do you now avoid similar events; did this event this reinforce a decision to 
avoid similar situations? 
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Appendix F: Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SP AI) 
Developed by S.M. Turner, C.V. Dancu, and D.C. Beidel 
Below is a list of behaviors that mayor may not be relevant for you. Based on your personal 
experience, please indicate how frequently you experience these feelings and thoughts in social situations. 
A social situation is defined as a gathering of two or more people. For example: A meeting; a lecture, a 
party, bar or restaurant, conversint with one another person or group of people, etc. FEELING ANXIOUS 
IS A MEASURE OF HOW TENSE NERVOUS OR UNCOMFORTABLE YOU ARE DURING SOCIA 
ENCOUNTERS. Please use the scale listed below and circle the number which best reflects how 
frequently you experience these responses. 
Never 
1 
Very 
Infrequent 
2 
Infrequent 
3 
Sometimes 
4 
Very 
Frequent 
5 
Very 
6 
Always 
7 
1) I feel anxious when entering social situations where there is a small group .................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
2) I feel anxious when entering social situations where there is a large group ..................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
3) I feel anxious when I am in a social situation and I become the center of attention ............ l 2 3 4 
567 
4) I feel anxious when I am in a social situation and I am expected to engage in some activity. 1 2 3 4 
567 
5) I feel anxious when making a speech in front of an audience .. , .................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
6) I feel anxious when speaking in a small informal meeting .......................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
7) I feel so anxious about attending social gatherings that I avoid these situations .................. 1 2 3 4 
567 
8) I feel so anxious in social situations that I leave the social gathering .............................. I 2 3 4 
567 
9) I feel anxious when in a small gathering with: 
Strangers ................................................................................... , ................ , .............................. 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
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People in general .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
10) I feel anxious when in a large gathering with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... l 2 3 4 
567 
People in general.. ........................................................................................ I 2 3 4 
567 
11) I feel anxious when in a bar or restaurant with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
People in general.. ........................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
12) I feel anxious and I do not know what to do when in a new situation with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general.. ........................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
13) I feel anxious and I do not know what to do when in a situation involving confrontation with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
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People in general.. ........................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
14) 1 feel anxious and 1 do not know what to do when in an embarrassing situation with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
People in general. ......................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
15) 1 feel anxious when discussing intimate feelings with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
16) I feel anxious when stating an opinion to: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general.. ........................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
17) I feel anxious when talking about business with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
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People in general .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
18) I feel anxious when approaching and/or initiating a conversation with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
19) I feel anxious when having to interact for longer than a few minutes with: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general.. ..... , ......... , ........................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
20) I feel anxious when (drinking any type of beverage) and/or eating in front of: 
Strangers ........................................................................ , .......................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ......... '" ................... " ................. , ......... " ................................. 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general.. ..... , .................. , ........ , ...... '" ............................................. 1 2 3 4 
567 
21) I feel anxious when writing or typing in front of: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............. , .......................... , ...................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
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People in general.. ........................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
22) I feel anxious when speaking in front of: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general.. ........................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
23) I feel anxious when being criticized or rejected by: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
People in generaL ......................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
24) I attempt to avoid social situations where there are: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
People in general. ......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
25) I leave social situations where there are: 
Strangers ................................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Authority figures .......................................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
Opposite sex ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
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People in general.. .. , .................................... , ..................................... , .......... I 2 3 4 
567 
26) Before entering a social situation I think about all the things that can go wrong. The types of thoughts 
I experience are: 
WillI be dressed properly? ...................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
I will probably make a mistake and look foolish ...................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
What wi II I do if no one speaks to me? ............... , ........... , ............ , ........... , ........... I 2 3 4 
567 
If there is a lag in the conversation what can I talk about? ................. , ........................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
People will notice how anxious I am ............................... , ........... , ....................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
27) I feel anxious before entering a social situation ....................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
28) My voice leaves me or changes when I am talking in a social situation ........................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
29) I am not likely to speak to people until they speak to me ............................................ 1 2 3 4 
567 
30) I experience troublesome thoughts when I am in a social setting. For example: 
I wish I could leave and avoid the whole situation ................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
If! mess up again] will really lose my confidence ................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
What kind of impression am I making? .................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Whatever I say it will probably sound stupid ......................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
31) I experience the following prior to entering a social situation: 
Sweating .................................................................................................... l 2 3 4 
567 
Frequent urge to urinate ................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
Heart palpitations .......................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
567 
125 
----------
32) I experience the following in a social situation: 
Sweating .................................................................................................... I 
567 
Blushing ..................................................................................................... 1 
567 
Shaking ...................................................................................................... 1 
567 
Frequent urge to urinate .................................................................................. I 
567 
Heart palpitations .......................................................................................... 1 
567 
33) I feel anxious when r am home alone .................................................................. 1 
567 
34) r feel anxious when I am in a strange place ............................................................ 1 
567 
35) I feel anxious when I am on any form of public transportation (e.g., bus, train, airplane) ....... I 
567 
36) I feel anxious when crossing streets ..................................................................... 1 
567 
37) I feel anxious when I am in crowded public places (e.g., Stores, church, movies, etc.) ......... I 
567 
38) Being in large open spaces makes me feel anxious ................................................... 1 
567 
39) I feel anxious when I am in enclosed places (e.g. elevators, tunnels, etc.) ........................ 1 
567 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 
..., 
4 .J 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 
..., 
4 .J 
2 3 4 
40) Being in high places makes me feel anxious (e.g., tall buildings) ................................. I 2 3 4 
567 
41) I feel anxious when waiting in a long line ............................................................. I 2 3 4 
567 
42) There are times when r feel like I have to hold on to things because r am afraid r will fall .... I 2 3 4 
567 
43) When I leave home and go to various public places, I go with a family member or friend ..... 1 2 3 4 
567 
44) I feel anxious when riding in a car ...................................................................... I 2 3 4 
567 
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45) There are certain places I do not go to because I may feel trapped ................................. I 2 3 4 
567 
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Appendix G: Brief Demographic Form 
Demographic Information 
Name: -------------------------------
Age: --------------------------------
Sex: --------------------------------
Class (e.g. freshman, sophomore, etc.) __________________________ _ 
Ethnicity: __________________________ _ 
Course to which research credit applies (if any): __________________________ _ 
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and other anxiety disorders. Poster to be presented at the Annual Association of 
Behavior and Cognitive Therapies Convention, November 13-16, Orlando, FL. 
Schrock, M, Kertz, S. J., Hosey, R.P., Williams, S., & Woodruff-Borden, J. (2008). 
Impact of parental anxiety on parent's perceptions of child behavior. Poster to be 
presented at the Annual Association of Behavior and Cognitive Therapies 
Convention, November 13-16, Orlando, FL. 
Teaching Experience 
Spring 2011 Introduction to Psychology (Undergraduate) 
Graduate Teaching Assistant 
Professor: Melissa Rowe, Ph.D. 
University of Louisville 
Primary responsibilities: Grading exams, managing online grading system, preparing 
material for review lectures, conducting review lectures, maintaining 
office hours, providing academic support, proctoring exams. 
Spring 2011 Social Psychology (Undergraduate) 
Graduate Teaching Assistant 
Barbara Stetson, Ph. D. 
University of Louisville 
Primary responsibilities: Grading exams, managing online grading system, preparing 
material for lectures (e.g., power point presentations), reviewing and 
grading papers, maintaining office hours, providing academic support, 
proctoring exams. 
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2009-2010 Intellectual and Cognitive Assessment (Graduate) 
University of Louisville 
Supervisor: Bernadette Walter, Ph.D. 
Primary Responsibilities: Teaching administration, scoring, and interpretation ofWAIS-
IV and WISC-IV to first year graduate students, observing and providing 
feedback for training administrations of the instruments, reviewing and 
providing feedback for training assessment reports. 
2009-2010 Interviewing Skills Practicum (Graduate) 
University of Louisville 
Supervisor: Bernadette Walter, Ph.D. 
Primary responsibilities: Observing first year graduate students conducting clinical 
(training) interviews and providing feedback on interviewing skills. 
Reviewing and grading written material for each training module. 
Professional Memberships 
American Psychological Association 
Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies 
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